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Abstract 
The current financial crisis the US and the world finds itself embroiled in has all of the 
markings of a once-in-a-generation type of economic contraction. In times like these, it is 
natural to search for comparable frames of reference; Japan’s own banking crisis during 
the “lost decade” of the 1990’s provides significant parallels to the current state of affairs. 
Given the severity and relative recentness of the Japanese crisis, the policy levers 
implemented by the Japanese authorities in response hold considerable interest as US 
policymakers struggle to grapple with the present crisis. The 1996 implementation of 
Japanese Big Bang, nomenclature for sweeping financial sector reforms, bestowed upon 
Japanese authorities significant powers to either bailout troubled financial institutions or 
outright let them fail.  The cases of Yamaichi Securities and the Long-Term Credit Bank 
of Japan, two casualties of the Japanese crisis, are examined in the context of these 
powers and compared to two similar US cases, Lehman Brothers and Fannie Mae.  
Market responses from the Yamaichi and LTCB cases suggest that clearly communicated 
actions taken by the Japanese authorities helped instill confidence and facilitate recovery 
in the financial sector, despite criticism leveled at the time.  As such, key takeaways from 
the Japanese experience may provide a template for solving aspects of the current US-led 
financial crisis. 
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1 Introduction 
As at the time of writing, there is already little dispute that the current US-led financial 
crisis has all the markings of a once-in-a-generation type of economic contraction. 
Discouraging preliminary numbers suggest this is not going to be a mild recession.  
Although the stages of the crisis are still being played out, the worry amongst 
policymakers – and, obviously, affected people around the world – is that the economic 
malaise will linger indefinitely, with little relief in sight. 
 
In times like these, the search for comparable frames of reference inevitably begins.  One 
of the more popular eras being quoted by commentators is the Great Depression of the 
1930’s, given its tremendous scale and devastating worldwide effects. The banking crisis 
that ensnared the Nordic countries (Sweden, most notably) in the early 1990’s is also 
getting considerable ink and airplay.  And, of course, Japan’s troubling banking crisis 
during its “lost decade” of the 1990’s is gaining momentum among interested observers 
as a striking parallel to the current state of affairs.  
 
The Japanese banking crisis provides the foundation for this Master’s thesis in Asian 
studies.  Given the severity and relative recentness of the Japanese crisis, the policy 
levers implemented by the Japanese authorities in response hold considerable interest as 
US policymakers presently struggle to grapple with its own crisis.  
 
The Japanese authorities were widely criticized for their sluggish response to the bursting 
of the bubble economy.  Sweeping financial sector reforms, in the configuration of the 
so-called “Japanese Big Bang”, were not introduced until 1996, more than a half decade 
after the economy’s zenith. Still, better late than never, Japanese Big Bang proved to be a 
watershed development.  Among other things, the reforms bestowed significant legal 
powers upon Japanese authorities to make key decisions on what essentially amounts to 
the going concern of troubled financial institutions.  In other words, the augmented 
ability of Japanese authorities to either inject public capital into (i.e., bailout) troubled 
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banks and financial institutions or outright let them fail is highly significant in the context 
of both the health of the financial sector and the economy as a whole. 
 
Therefore, from this, a research question may be posed.  Specifically, what do market 
responses to the Japanese authorities’ interventionist efforts to stabilize the Japanese 
financial system say about the effectiveness of such measures, and what conclusions, if 
any, can be drawn in light of the current US financial crisis? 
 
In the following pages, background is provided on the history of the Japanese financial 
sector, both pre- and post-bubble.  Key responses of the Japanese authorities with respect 
to the Big Bang regulatory provisions and, in more detail, their actions in the specific 
cases of troubled financial institutions Yamaichi Securities and Long-Term Credit Bank 
of Japan are explored.  Structured largely as comparisons, background on the current US 
financial crisis is also examined, as well as the US authorities’ actions regarding two of 
its own distressed financial institutions – Lehman Brothers and the Federal Home 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). 
 
Based on the findings, it appears that the clearly communicated actions taken by the 
Japanese authorities in the Yamaichi Securities and Long-Credit Bank of Japan cases 
ultimately helped instill confidence and facilitate recovery in the Japanese financial 
sector.  Applying learned lessons from the Japanese experience may go a long way in 
expediently overcoming the current crisis with a minimum of unnecessary hardship.  
 
 
2 Research Methodology 
Obviously, researching all aspects of the Japanese banking crisis, Big Bang, and the US 
financial crisis is infeasible given the guidelines for this study.  Therefore, specific focus 
on the decisions of Japanese authorities to either inject public capital (via bailout, 
nationalization) into troubled banks and financial institutions or let them fail – and then 
comparing selected situations to commensurate US cases – will be given priority.  
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Specifically, the cases of Yamaichi Securities and Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan will 
be examined against the US situations of Lehman Brothers and Fannie Mae.  
 
Accordingly, the case method provides the structural foundation for this thesis. Attention 
will focus on the background and responses of the respective Japanese and US authorities 
in each of the four situations. However, measuring whether the authorities’ actions are 
succeeding with respect to buttressing the health of the financial sector and the economy 
at large presents a significant challenge.  With no single parameter able to perfectly 
gauge the effectiveness of the policy actions, a multi-pronged approach has been 
implemented.  
 
Emphasis will be placed on qualitative observations in this study.  Aspects of the 
qualitative include, but are not limited to, firms’ historical background, the prevailing 
political and economic environment, details regarding the authorities’ policy responses, 
and resultant consequences on the financial sector and economy at large.  With respect to 
the Japanese cases, a mix of academic and news sources have been utilized.  Such 
sources include, but are not limited to, literature from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Harvard International Review, Euromoney, Japan Times, and the Far Eastern 
Economic Review. Due to the very current nature of the US subprime mortgage crisis, 
articles from the financial press are prominent in the corresponding analysis.  Sources 
here include, but are not limited to, literature from The New York Times, The Guardian, 
CFA Institute Magazine, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
 
Second, to bolster the qualitative analysis and also provide a more quantifiable angle on 
each case and the relative immediate success of the implemented policy measures, short-
term movements of selected financial market indices comprise an important part of this 
study. Financial markets are acutely attuned to economic conditions and move 
accordingly in real-time.  As such, when material information is disseminated into the 
public domain, market reaction is reflected in prices; this line of thinking is consistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1991, p. 1575), a fundamental financial 
concept. 
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Information concerning public authorities’ actions in the financial sector constitutes 
material information and, without a doubt, in both the Japanese and US crises, authorities 
have made consequential decisions.  Markets have moved in response and such market 
reaction – when analyzed in conjunction with prevailing qualitative factors – provides 
information regarding the success of the authorities’ efforts.  In this vein, one-week 
market movements in the following financial market indices have been used in the 
analysis of the case discussions:  
• TED Spread. This statistic, measured in basis points, is calculated as the 
difference between 3-month US Treasury bills (T-bills) and the 3-month 
Eurodollars contract as represented by the 3-month US dollar London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR).  Coxe (2008, p. 26) notes: 
“ … the TED spread measures risk within the global banking system.  
Eurodollars are the primary instrument of inter-bank lending – 
unregulated and uninsured dollars.  Therefore, the spread over T-bills 
reflects bankers’ pricing of the risk in short-term loans to each other.  It 
always spikes in advance of a financial crisis.  It always falls when the 
crisis is past … [the TED spread] has kept its 100% [forecasting] 
accuracy through all financial crises since 1974.” 
Stated in other words, when there is a crisis of confidence in the financial system, 
bankers are less willing to lend to each other since they do not trust that their 
counterparties are on sound financial footing.  Hence, when they lend to other 
banks in the Eurodollar market, they will demand a higher interest rate than 
normal.  If one considers that lending to the US government through the purchase 
of US T-bills is risk-free (that is, the US government would never default), then 
the difference in yield demanded by the bank lender of another bank vis-à-vis the 
US government becomes a telling indicator of financial sector risk in the 
economy.  Therefore, the TED Spread should decline if the actions of authorities 
are successful in re-instilling confidence in the financial sector. In this study, the 
TED Spread is used to examine this very sentiment in the money markets, in the 
wake of key interventionist decisions made by US authorities.  
• Japanese Yen 3-Month Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR). TIBOR represents 
rates at which banks lend one another funds in the short-term, Japanese money 
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market (Japan Bankers Association, 2009).  Similar to the TED Spread, TIBOR 
provides information on the confidence and risk present in the financial system – 
the higher the TIBOR, the higher the risk. In this study, the TIBOR is used to 
measure sentiment in money markets with respect to key interventionist decisions 
made by Japanese authorities.    
• Prices of financial sector stocks.  According to an empirical study by Hong et al. 
(2002, p. 16), the performance of US financial stocks is highly statistically 
significant in its ability to predict the direction of the overall market, “with a two 
standard deviation shock in its returns resulting in a movement of [overall] market 
returns that is 74% of market volatility.” Such market leadership by the financial 
sector is apparent by a period of up to two months (Hong et al., 2002, p.16).  
Therefore, if one accepts that the actions of the authorities have a significant 
impact on the direction of financial sector equities and the stock market as a 
whole, then examining price reactions of financial stocks may provide insight on 
both the success of the authorities’ implemented measures and the well-being of 
the entire economy.  Financial sector equity price indices used in this study 
include the Nikkei Bank Index for Japanese financials and the Keefe, Bruyette, & 
Woods (KBW) Bank Index for US financials.  In addition, where possible, moves 
in the share prices of the individual case financial companies have also been 
examined.  
• Prices of the overall stock market. To gauge reaction in the overall stock market 
and, by extension, the respective economies as a whole, the Nikkei 225 Index and 
the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index have been utilized in conjunction with the 
Japanese and US stock markets, respectively. 
 
In sum, a combination of the qualitative and the quantitative are used to obtain a 
composite opinion on the success of implemented decisions.   Certainly, given the 
limitations imposed by the guidelines of this study and restrictions concerning the 
collection of some quantitative data, such opinions are not to be judged as conclusive but 
rather as a contribution to the continuing debate regarding financial crises policy 
responses. Further, it should be stressed that all analysis conducted in this study only 
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takes into account events that have occurred to 15 January 2009. It is noted that 
subsequent events may make aspects of this research study already dated at the time of 
publication. 
 
 
3 Japanese Financial Sector 
From an economic standpoint, modern Japan refers to the remarkable era subsequent to 
the Second World War, where the Pacific island nation’s economy soared to 
unprecedented heights.  Such export-led economic growth involved heavy doses of 
government intervention and support. With respect to the makeup of the Japanese 
financial sector, the market was highly regulated up until the end of the 1970s. This type 
of regulatory environment was common amongst sectors across the spectrum of the 
Japanese economy, and not peculiar to the financial sector in any way. 
 
Overall, the Japanese financial system favoured banks.  The banking sector was acutely 
segmented, banking and securities firms were separated, virtually all interest rates were 
controlled by the government, foreign exchange was tightly controlled, and the variety of 
available financial instruments was limited and, subject to, approval by Zaimu-shō, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance (Lincoln and Litan, 1998).  Monetary policy tended to 
operate through more interventionist quantitative measures such as varying the supply of 
central bank credit to the banking system rather than through interest rates, a more 
market-based approach (Lincoln and Litan, 1998). With interest rates set below market 
rates, the Japanese government was also in a position to influence commercial banks' 
allocation of credit to industry (Lincoln and Litan, 1998). 
 
Given such a government-collaborative and business-segmented approach, the Japanese 
financial system came to be known as both a “convoy” and a “compartmentalized” 
system.  Then, financial sector deregulation began slowly and gradually in the 1980s 
(Honda, 2003, p. 137).  Key regulatory liberalizations included: 
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• Capital market deregulation.  This included the lifting of the prohibition on short-
term Euroyen loans (which were not subject to interest rate controls) to domestic 
borrowers, the removal of restrictions on access to the corporate bond market, and 
the creation of the commercial paper market (Kanaya and Woo, 2000, pp. 5-6). 
• Relaxation of interest rate controls (Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p. 5). 
 
Burgeoning Japanese stock and bond markets, coupled with this limited foray into 
deregulation, would change the landscape of the Japanese financial sector.  Given the 
lofty prices and low yields afforded by the market to Japanese equities and debt issues – 
and, with deregulation, the newfound ability to take advantage of such conditions – large, 
blue chip, Japanese companies found it more attractive to raise money through the capital 
markets instead of borrowing it from the banks as they had in the past.   
 
Figure 1: The Japanese Stock Market’s Bubble Boom (1982-90). The roaring Japanese stock market 
during the 1980’s brought the Nikkei 225 Index to the brink of 40,000 by late 1989.  With such inflated 
equity prices, it was advantageous for Japanese companies to take advantage of market conditions and 
raise capital through stock issuance instead of borrowing from banks, which was previously the dominating 
form of financing.  With fewer blue chip clients to lend to, many Japanese banks expanded their loan books 
to riskier clients. Quantitative data source: Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo), 
Bloomberg. 
 
Domino effect in place, Japanese banks were forced to look for new borrowers.  
However, the credit quality of these borrowers was generally lower than the blue chip 
customers associated with more traditional bank lending.  According to Honda (2003, p. 
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137), banks tried to maintain or even increase their total loans outstanding probably in 
order to keep their employees – legacy of the Japanese tradition of lifetime employment.  
Further, it appears that the creditworthiness of potential borrowers was assessed more on 
the value of collateral than their business’ cash flow generation potential.  This was a 
failing of risk management, since the value of outstanding collateral was directly linked 
to inflated asset prices (e.g., real estate) instead of the actual ability to repay in cash. 
 
With brewing issues perhaps blinded by a booming economy and rocketing markets, 
venturing into new lines of lending was encouraged by the Ministry of Finance and the 
large commercial banks moved heavily into real estate, consumer, and small and medium 
enterprise lending throughout the course of the 1980s.  However, “lacking the ability to 
properly assess risk, their loan books quickly became marred in imprudence” (Lincoln 
and Litan, 1998). 
 
The inability to properly assess risk by the banks is possibly attributable to the uneven 
deregulatory efforts of the Japanese government.  As indicated by Ueda (1998, p. 259): 
“Tight controls of bank behaviour by regulators had long been a substitute for risk 
management by banks themselves and for monitoring by shareholders and depositors.  
But the controls were successively relaxed in the 1970s and 1980s.  On the other hand 
banks had not yet started using modern risk management techniques. Depositors still had 
faith in regulators’ ability to protect them.  Thus, a vacuum emerged in bank risk 
management.” 
 
The banks’ indiscretion – and hence, the abundant availability of liquidity and easy credit 
– played a large role in fueling real estate and stock market speculation during the late 
1980s. The subsequent collapse of those speculative bubbles left the overmatched 
banking sector saddled with enormous volumes of nonperforming loans and badly 
tarnished reputations. As an example, at the end of the third quarter of 1997, 
nonperforming loans officially totaled ¥28 trillion or some US$230 billion, a staggering 
amount (Lincoln and Litan, 1998).  The weakened banking sector has, of course, had 
serious negative implications for the Japanese economy as a whole. Beyond the fiscal 
cost associated with the restructuring of banks – to 2000, funds equivalent to 12% of 
GDP have already been allocated by the government for this purpose (Kanaya and Woo, 
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2000, p. 4) – the banking crisis was probably responsible to a great extent for the 
stagnation of the Japanese economy during the 1990s (Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p. 4). 
 
Indeed, the overvalued Japanese stock market peaked in 1989 and slid thereafter.  When 
added to the steep decline in real estate prices, the strength of Japanese financial 
institutions was undermined. Essentially, the complications were threefold: (1) as the 
prices of property holdings by real estate companies dropped, the quality of loans to the 
real estate industry also deteriorated; (2) the value of existing collateral also eroded; and 
(3) overall, slowing economic growth nullified the ability of borrowers to effectively 
service their loans (Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p.8). 
 
However, in spite of their damaged loan books, banks were slow to write off loans with a 
low probability of recovery.  This was partly due to strict tax guidelines that permitted 
write-offs only after the loan loss amount had been established in bankruptcy proceedings 
(Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p.11).  Also, it is believed that some banks were reluctant to 
write off bad loans for the fear that some distressed borrowers might perceive such action 
as a sign that the banks had given up on loan recovery and, thus, “it was okay” for clients 
to slow or stop repayments (Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p.11). 
 
Figure 2: The Japanese Stock Market: Post-Bubble (1990-94). When the Japanese asset bubble popped, 
the stock market fell precipitously and never recovered to its previous highs.  In the post-bubble period, 
Japanese financial institutions struggled terribly, along with the rest of the Japanese economy. 
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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The banks’ lack of action in expediently responding to the post-bubble economy may 
also be associated with corporate governance issues.  Though shares of most major 
financial institutions were widely distributed, concentration of ownership centred around 
four major groups: life insurance companies, corporate borrowers of the banks, bank 
employees, and other banks.  For the main reasons listed in the parentheses – life 
insurance companies (weak governance themselves), corporate borrowers of the banks 
(more interested in securing beneficial borrowing terms than high returns on their bank 
shareholdings), bank employees (Japanese business culture that encouraged employees to 
side with management), and other banks (cross-shareholdings used as a means to 
discourage hostile takeovers, legacy of the “convoy system”) – corporate governance of 
the banks remained unobtrusive to management actions during this period (Kanaya and 
Woo, 2000, p. 20).  As such, bank management was never really under constant pressure 
to focus on profitability, and instead concentrated on market share and providing stable 
employment and services for clients.  As such, there was inadequate incentive to make 
difficult decisions for longer-term restructuring. 
 
 
4 Japanese Regulatory Response 
Infamously, the Japanese authorities did not proactively introduce reforms for the 
struggling financial sector during the immediate post-bubble, 1990-95 period.  To be fair, 
dealing with this type of financial crisis was unprecedented in modern Japanese history.  
The authorities’ inaction was due in part to what turned out to be a false hope that the 
economy would soon turn the corner and that a full economic recovery would buoy the 
banks (Nishimura in Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p. 26).  After 1995, even though it had 
become clear that the banks’ problems had considerably worsened and a more systematic 
public intervention would be inevitable, regulators hesitated to take strong action because 
of their fear in triggering a public panic (Kanaya and Woo, 2000, p. 26). 
 
Still, the seeds for significant reform were being sown during this period, even if they 
would not manifest in overt action for several years.  For instance, there were key 
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changes in Japanese political economy.  The end of Jiyū-Minshutō (Liberal Democratic 
Party) one party-rule in 1993, however brief, was instrumental in proving that political 
inertia when action was needed could actually result in failure to get re-elected (Toya, 
2006, p. 1).  And, soon enough, reforms would come – in the image of the “Japanese Big 
Bang.”   
 
In November 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto introduced the Big Bang – 
nomenclature for extensive financial system reform. The Big Bang was to be based on 
the principles of free markets, fair trade backed by transparent and reliable rules, and 
global standards (Japan Ministry of Finance, 2000), and essentially featured vast 
deregulation and measures to strengthen banks and other financial institutions.  This was 
done with a view of rebuilding the Japanese financial market into an international 
financial marketplace comparable to those in the United States and United Kingdom 
(Japan Ministry of Finance, 2000), whose own deregulations were seen at the time as 
glowing successes. 
 
Big Bang consisted of a sweeping legislative package, reforming most existing financial 
laws and establishing new ones.  Key reforms included the breaking down of the 
compartmentalized nature of Japanese financial sector, the introduction of new types of 
investment vehicles, and the allowance of trade in over-the-counter derivatives (Goto, 
1999, p. 32).   Further, the anti-monopoly laws were relaxed to allow for the 
establishment of financial holding companies, thereby making it easier for financial 
institutions to engage in different types of financial businesses.  In addition, measures to 
enable greater securitization of assets were enacted (Goto, 1999, p. 32).   
 
Highly significant changes were also made to the Japan’s financial regulatory 
infrastructure.  Day-to-day supervision of financial markets was transferred from the 
Ministry of Finance to a new body, the Kin'yūchō (the Financial Supervisory Agency or 
FSA), effective June 1998.  Operating at arm’s length from the government, the FSA 
sought to improve regulatory oversight through better responsiveness to the market.  The 
FSA’s supervision and inspection of Japanese financial institutions was placed under the 
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auspices of another new government organization, Kinyu Saisei Iinkai (the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission or FRC), which was established in December 1998.  One of 
the main missions of the FRC was, and is, to handle issues related to failed financial 
institutions (Goto, 1999, p. 33).  
 
With respect to safety nets provided in the event of failed institutions, a broad suite of 
measures were introduced by Big Bang.   First, under the new “prompt corrective action” 
system, financial institutions were categorized by reference to their capital ratios, and 
subject to the FRC orders to take the corrective action where applicable (Goto, 1999, p. 
33).  Namely, financial institutions were required to pursue self-assessment of their assets 
and make appropriate write-offs and reserves for problem loans. 
 
Second, the Early Stabilization Law provided emergency measures to increase the capital 
of financial institutions where it was deemed necessary.  Specifically, the FRC was given 
the power, upon request by a distressed bank or financial institution, to make decisions on 
capital injections by having the Yokina Hoken Kikou (Deposit Insurance Corporation of 
Japan or DICJ) subscribe to the equity shares of that bank or financial institution (Goto, 
1999, p. 34).  Further, the FRC was given the authority to impose on such distressed 
financial institutions operating conditions such as a restructuring of management (Goto, 
1999, p. 34).  
 
Third, the Kinyu Saisei Hou (Financial Revitalization Law) provided powers to deal with 
failed financial institutions and to purchase assets of such institutions.  Specifically, if the 
FRC deemed that a bank or financial institution was “failed”, a financial superintendent 
could be appointed to take control of the management of the assets of such an institution 
and search for another institution to take over its business (Goto, 1999, p. 34). If no 
financial institution to take over the business were found, the business could be 
transferred to a bridge bank established by the DICJ, which would continue the business 
while searching for another financial institution to take over the business (Goto, 1999, 
p.34). If the failure of an institution were deemed to have an extremely grave effect on 
domestic or foreign markets, such an institution could even be nationalized. 
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Fourth, in order to procure the significant funds required by the type of financial 
assistance envisioned above under the Early Stabilization and Financial Revitalization 
Laws, under the Deposit Insurance Law, the DICJ was entitled to borrow funds from the 
Nihon Ginkō (Bank of Japan) and issue its own bonds with full backing of the Japanese 
government (Goto, 1999, p. 34).  These guarantee facilities were backed by deep pockets, 
in the aggregate amount of up to ¥60 trillion.  If this was what was required to stabilize 
the Japanese financial system, the government appeared committed to do what was 
necessary.  
 
And, during the late 1990’s period, these new measures in “crisis management” were put 
into action. Nissan Life Insurance, Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and 
Yamaichi Securities all failed in 1997.  The blue chip, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 
was effectively nationalized in 1998 and subsequently re-sold to New York-based 
Ripplewood Holdings in 2000 (Dawson, 1999, p. 68).  With emphasis, both the “convoy” 
and “compartmentalized” systems were no more and, in a relative blink of an eye, the 
shape of the Japanese financial sector was forever changed.   
 
Indeed, although Big Bang promised deregulation, it also increased government 
involvement with respect to making decisions on the going concern of key financial 
institutions in the event of crisis and potential contagion to the rest of the economy.  The 
Japanese government’s exercise of such authority speaks volumes about the severity of 
its crisis. Later in this paper, a closer look will be taken at the specific cases of Yamaichi 
Securities and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan. Next, however, is an overview of the 
US financial crisis as it has transpired, and continues to unfold.  
 
 
5 US Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
In his article, Clark (2008) quoted then US President George W. Bush in the wake of the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: “‘America's economy is facing unprecedented challenges 
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and we are responding with unprecedented action … there will be ample opportunities to 
debate the origins of this problem. Now is the time to solve it.’” 
 
Interestingly, the exceptional measures implemented by the US authorities to date have 
run in stark contrast to the very neoliberal conditions that arguably allowed for the 
precarious predicament to exist in the first place.  As Harvey (2006, p. 145) suggests, if 
one accepts that neoliberalism is generally defined by “the maximization of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private 
property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade,” then the state must keep 
interventions “to a bare minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices), and because powerful interests will 
inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own 
benefit.” However, the swift – and, frankly, heavily interventionist – action taken by US 
authorities since being beset by the financial crisis would suggest that this ideology has 
been tossed aside, at least temporarily. 
 
In essence, there appears to have been a major market failure here and, as it has been 
widely quoted in the press, this is a financial crisis that has its roots on Main Street.  
More specifically, this is the unraveling of a market bubble in real estate, and the 
negative implications are far-reaching not just for Americans but also anyone whose 
livelihood is linked to the global economy. 
 
The causes of the current financial crisis are varied and complex. However, one may try 
to simplify, in a single short statement, the scenario to this: too many US homeowners, 
who never had the financial wherewithal to be buying homes in the first place, are 
figuring out that the notion of “consume now, pay later”, actually means having to, 
indeed, pay later. Although open to debate, many would suggest that private home 
ownership has been made out by North American society as a Holy Grail of sorts, even in 
situations where this belies basic financial common sense. This is perhaps a sad 
commentary on the materialistic culture of consumption that pervades North American 
behaviour.  Competitively establishing personal prestige – or a sense of individualism, if 
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you will – is largely accomplished through the purchase of, ironically, increasingly 
commodified products.  In North America, home ownership has become just another 
commodity. As Coxe (2008, p. 15) writes: 
“It has become almost an article of political faith that all the blame for the current crisis 
falls on greedy denizens of Wall Street.  When somebody who has never made a payment 
on his/her mortgage is foreclosed, this is presented as an utter tragedy for which a corrupt 
system must be blamed – not the people who lived rent-free in a house they couldn’t 
possibly have ever afforded.” 
 
That said, Wall Street – including the bankers responsible for the mortgage lending which 
is now at the crux of the issue – is certainly not blameless in this fiasco. Greedily driven 
by quarterly reporting cycles and the prospects of extravagant performance bonuses, US 
financial institutions have aggressively lent to risky borrowers with little regard to the 
possible negative ramifications in the medium and long-term. Coxe (2008, p.15) even 
suggests that there are “many cases where people who really did intend to make their 
payments were sold unnecessarily complex and expensive products” by financial 
institutions of questionable scruples. 
 
The mentality of short-term profit maximization has extended throughout the modern 
financial system to active participants in the secondary mortgage market, a list which 
includes investment banks (e.g, Lehman Brothers), quasi-public mortgage institutions 
(e.g., Fannie Mae), and institutional investors such as hedge and pension funds.  Again, 
the one thing all involved have in common is the singular goal of maximizing returns and 
profits – all within a market mechanism that has been largely fostered by policies focused 
on letting it work with minimal regulatory interference.    
 
As such, it can be argued that institutionalized neoliberal conditions in the financial and 
real estate markets have made the misguided actions of so many possible. These 
conditions have been conducive for the availability of cheap and easy credit – or 
liquidity, to use another term.  As observed by Weber (2002, p. 529): 
“The [US] government actively accommodated the drive for liquidity in real estate by 
creating new forms of property and incentives to invest in real estate through tax policies 
… By creating a secondary mortgage market through quasipublic institutions … the state 
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has increased the total size of capital flows with the unattainable aim of reducing cyclical 
instability of real-estate capital.” 
 
The deluge of liquidity has created an environment for capitalism to run amok, enabling 
conspicuous consumption and the pursuit of profit with insufficient risk control. As 
Weber (2002, p. 522) further notes: “Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ 
captures the way in which capital’s restless search for profits requires constant renewal 
through galelike forces that simultaneously make way for the new and devalue the old.” 
The penchant for immediate gratification within the culture of consumption has 
overemphasized the maximization of utility in the short-term vis-à-vis potential future 
implications. Unfortunately, it is these implications that are coming back to “roost” at this 
point. 
 
From the significant action taken in recent months, it can be inferred that the US 
authorities also believe the financial crisis has been spawned by a major market failure.  
Understandably, the measures taken to date have been far-reaching.  For instance, from a 
monetary policy point of view, the US Federal Reserve (the Fed), through its Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC), has embarked on a very aggressive campaign of 
easing interest rates since August 2007, when many of the financial crisis’ ramifications 
began to openly emerge.  In December 2008, the FOMC reduced its target for the federal 
funds rate – the benchmark at which the Federal Reserve lends to banks – to a rock-
bottom range of between zero to 25 basis points.  In doing so, US Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke (2009) has indicated that such action is intended “to cushion the 
direct effects of the financial turbulence on the economy and to reduce the virulence of 
the so-called adverse feedback loop, in which economic weakness and financial stress 
become mutually reinforcing.”  In addition, the Fed has also been actively implementing 
other measures in its “policy toolkit”, namely lending to financial institutions, providing 
liquidity directly to key credit markets, and buying longer-term securities.  All of these 
policy measures “allow the Federal Reserve to continue to push down interest rates and 
ease credit conditions in a range of markets” (Bernanke, 2009).   
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The US Treasury Department has also been active in moving quickly to avert potential 
worst-case scenarios of the financial crisis.  One area in which such action is apparent is 
in its decisions to either bailout troubled financial institutions or let them fail.  Although 
the list of news-making failed and/or troubled financial institutions during this current US 
financial crisis continues to grow, two examples are cited here – (1) the case of Fannie 
Mae, which is categorized as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) and (2) Lehman 
Brothers, an investment banking firm – to illustrate the Treasury’s implemented actions 
within this realm. 
 
Notably, as the implications of the financial crisis worsened throughout the summer 
months of 2008, on 7 September, US Treasury effectively nationalized Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), two GSE’s whose primary 
functions were to operate in the mortgage secondary market.  A week later, on 15 
September 2008, US Treasury stood by while troubled Lehman Brothers, a renowned 
Wall Street investment banking firm which was founded in the 19th century and had 
famously survived both the US Civil War and the Great Depression, slid into bankruptcy.  
The government’s steadfastness in not bailing out Lehman was, and is, considered to be a 
“line in the sand” of sorts, importantly signaling to the market that the US government is 
not willing to stand behind all risk-taking in the financial system which would thereby 
“create moral hazard that would take years to undo and [expand] taxpayers’ liability 
almost without limit” (The Economist, 2008).  
 
In keeping with the format of this paper, both the cases of Lehman Brothers and Fannie 
Mae – and their significance in the context of the current US crisis – will be discussed at 
greater length in a following section. 
 
The fear that the crisis would extend beyond financial and real estate markets has been 
well-founded and, in response to signs of a freeze in general credit markets, US 
authorities moved further to formalize its interventionist efforts in October 2008.  
Specifically, the Bush Administration, in conjunction with US Treasury, requested 
US$700 billion in funds from US Congress to implement a financial rescue package, 
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which has since come to be known as the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).  The 
chief aim of TARP is to stabilize the financial system through the purchase of equity and 
troubled assets of banks and financial institutions.  In essence, the main intentions of 
TARP are to bolster the capital positions of participating banks and financial institutions 
as well as to encourage the resumption of lending at normal levels. In a statement 
introducing the program, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (2008) stated the “goal is to 
see a wide array of healthy institutions sell preferred shares to the Treasury, and raise 
additional private capital, so that they can make more loans to businesses and consumers 
across the nation.” 
 
In addition, the new Obama Administration and US Congress are presently discussing a 
substantial fiscal package that, if enacted, could provide a significant boost to economic 
activity according to Bernanke (2009).  The US Federal Reserve Chairman further 
opines: “however, fiscal actions are unlikely to promote a lasting recovery unless they are 
accompanied by strong measures to further stabilize and strengthen the financial system.  
History demonstrates conclusively that a modern economy cannot grow if its financial 
system is not operating effectively” (Bernanke, 2009).     
 
As a corollary, it would appear that most observers would agree that the US 
government’s actions have been very necessary.  However, looking further afield, 
commentators such as McKenna (2008) wonder if “seeds of the next bubble [are being] 
sown in the process. As the government steps in, banks and homeowners will make the 
assumption that Uncle Sam will step in again the next time they're in trouble.”  In other 
words, as previously indicated, the issue here is the classic economic problem of moral 
hazard – authorities that appear all too willing to bail out troubled financial actors run the 
risk that these actors will, in the presence of such a backstop, engage in risky behaviour 
that might be deemed sub-optimal for the good of society.   
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6 Japanese Experience and Significance of Study Given Current US Events 
If ingrained, moral hazard becomes nothing less than a blight on the efficient workings of 
the market system and, as such, revisiting the important measures implemented by 
Japanese authorities during the island nation’s recent banking crisis becomes critical in 
light of current events in the United States.  Japanese Big Bang granted significant power 
to authorities to make decisions on the going concern of financial institutions, which are 
vital to the operation of a global capitalist economy.  In other words, the ability of 
Japanese authorities to either inject public capital into troubled banks and financial 
institutions or let them fail is rather striking in a broad financial sector reform initiative 
where arguably greater attention has been given to its deregulatory aspects.  Surely, while 
the aspects of deregulation – greater competition among financial institutions, the 
allowance of foreign financial firms to operate on a more level playing field in Japan, 
more investment options for savers (The Economist, 2000) – have been significant, the 
increased willingness of the Japanese authorities to intervene, whether by action (capital 
injections, nationalization) or inaction (letting institutions fail) is especially notable.   
 
Capitalism on the way up and socialism on the way down?  Flippant as it sounds, in the 
face of the current financial crisis, this is a question that has been asked given responses 
of US authorities to troubled financial institutions such as Fannie Mae and Lehman 
Brothers.  With such recent history, it seems inevitable that the Japanese experience with 
its own troubled financial institutions has served, at the very least, as a reference point for 
today’s policymakers.  Fixing the present financial system with a minimum of 
unnecessary hardship may well be the reward for heeding the lessons of history. 
 
 
7 Case Studies 
7.1 Yamaichi Securities 
7.1.1 Background 
With roots dating back to the 19th century, Yamaichi Securities was a big name in 
Japanese finance. Still, Yamaichi Securities had been in trouble before.  Back in 1965, 
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Yamaichi skirted dangerously close to bankruptcy – a three-year run of negative 
operating results culminated in highly negative press coverage which, in turn, compelled 
panicky investors to rapidly withdraw their funds thereby causing a run on the securities 
trading firm (Shale, 1995, p. 8).  Of course, at the time, having a financial institution fail 
was very unpalatable for the authorities and, as such, the Bank of Japan stepped up to 
lend Yamaichi over ¥28 billion to help the firm out of its mess (Shale, 1995, p. 8). 
 
Yamaichi ultimately recovered and, indeed, thrived.  Along with Nomura, Daiwa, and 
Nikko, the firm became known as one of Japan’s so-called “Big Four brokerages.” 
Although Yamaichi was the smallest of the four, as the Japanese economy boomed, the 
firm became a major player in international securities markets and offices were opened in 
foreign financial capitals such as New York, London, Frankfurt, and Singapore.   Like 
almost all Japanese financial institutions, it could seemingly do no wrong as fortunes 
soared during the 1980s.  Then, the Nikkei peaked in late 1989 before subsequently 
plummeting – and everything for Yamaichi changed. 
 
Figure 3: Yamaichi Securities: Peaking … then Sliding (1988-97). Like many Japanese companies, 
Yamaichi Securities’ fortunes burst along with the asset Japanese asset bubble circa 1989-90. Quantitative 
data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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7.1.2 “Crisis” Event: Causes and Description 
Like in many contexts, success during good times masked serious issues that became 
apparent when fortunes turned.  For Yamaichi, the tumbling Nikkei meant its clients were 
losing money on their investment accounts, something that was unheard of in recent 
memory.  Instead of simply letting the market work, Yamaichi’s greedy corporate and 
institutional clients put enormous pressure on the firm to compensate them on their 
losses.   As any financial professional is aware, compensating select investors for their 
market losses is highly unethical – for one, the unfairness is obvious and two, it is utterly 
damaging to both the perceived and structural integrity of the markets.  According to 
Horvat (1998, p. 59), as the smallest and weakest of the Big Four brokerages, Yamaichi 
was the least capable of standing up to such pressure.  Yamaichi obliged – and the real 
trouble began. 
 
To be fair, Yamaichi was not alone in compensating clients for trade losses and 
(somewhat incredulously) such practices did not appear to be clearly illegal before 1992.  
However, what set the Big Four firm apart was the lengths it went to assuage disgruntled 
institutional clients and stay ahead of regulatory authorities when the regulations did 
change. Specifically, Yamaichi executives resorted to an illegal tobashi scheme, which 
entailed temporarily hiding losses of a given client by shifting them to the accounts of 
another client (whether real or feigned) so as to permit the first client to artificially flatter 
or “window-dress” its results (Horvat, 1998, p. 59).  However, in the absence of market 
recovery, this type of financial fraud always catches up with the perpetrator since losses 
cannot be moved around forever.  
 
When Yamaichi’s involvement in tobashi came to light, it badly tarnished the firm’s 
reputation, eroded customer confidence and negatively affected the firm’s operating 
results (Efron, 1997).   With the Nikkei entrenched in bear-mode, Yamaichi was ill-
equipped to handle these additional issues it brought upon itself.  Losses mounted.  Debt 
soared.  When the Asian financial crisis hit in the summer of 1997, Yamaichi was clearly 
on the ropes. 
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November 1997 became a time of reckoning for the Japanese financial sector, and the 
newly introduced provisions of Big Bang were put to the test.  Was Japan really serious 
about the principles behind the ambitious reform?   Yamaichi would test this resolve. 
While the failures of Sanyo Securities (a mid-sized brokerage firm) and Hokkaido 
Takushoku (a regional bank) during the month were newsworthy events, when Yamaichi 
executives announced on 24 November that the firm was effectively bankrupt and 
ceasing operations it was, quite frankly, a shocker.  With approximately US$190 billion 
of client assets under management at the time, Yamaichi’s failure dubiously set the 
record for being the largest Japanese corporate failure since World War II (Efron, 1997). 
 
7.1.3 Market and Government Response 
 
Figure 4: Japanese Equities in the Immediate Aftermath of Yamaichi’s Failure. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Yamaichi failure, Japanese equity markets responded negatively.  Yamaichi failed on 24 
November 1997; the Nikkei Bank Index closed down -7.7%, and the Nikkei 225 down -5.1%, the following 
day.  However, by the end of the week, both indices largely recovered their losses suggesting Japan’s 
decision not to return to the convoy system inspired confidence that they were serious about financial 
sector reform. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
When Japanese equity markets opened the next day, they responded negatively. The 
banking sector led the overall market into negative territory, with the Nikkei Bank Index 
falling -7.7% and the Nikkei 225 sliding -5.1% by close of trading on 25 November.   
According to Peek and Rosengren (1999, p. 13), the Yamaichi failure took many 
investors by surprise and highlighted the resounding issues still residing in the Japanese 
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financial sector.  The fear was that the extent of Japanese financial problems had not been 
fully disclosed and there was great uncertainty about creditor positions and the financial 
well-being of other similar financial institutions (Peek and Rosengren, 1999, p. 13).  The 
pending response from the Japanese authorities was crucial. 
 
Sticking steadfast to the Big Bang principle of “free and fair global markets”,  
Finance Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka confirmed it was the government’s intention to let 
Yamaichi – venerable name and all – go under (Efron, 1997).  In order to restore calm to 
Japanese and international markets, Mitsuzuka further pledged that Yamaichi’s investors 
would be protected (Efron, 1997).   Although Yamaichi, which had roughly a 5% market 
share in Japanese securities trades, was a major player, it was determined that its failure 
would not unduly destabilize financial markets and the government’s hard-line decision 
not to give in to the temptation of returning to the convoy system importantly signaled 
that Japan was serious about cleaning up its financial sector. 
 
In retrospect, the decision to stand by was highly significant; it seemed that a turning 
point in battling the Japanese crisis had been reached.  The equity markets responded 
accordingly – by the end of the week (28 November), both the Nikkei 225 and the Nikkei 
Bank Index had recovered sizable portions of the losses they posted in the immediate 
aftermath of the Yamaichi failure with one-week returns of -0.5% and -1.3%, 
respectively. 
 
However, of course, Yamaichi’s de facto bankruptcy did not mean that the Japanese 
financial sector was “out of the woods”, and the risks were reflected by rates in the 
Japanese money market. The 3-month TIBOR leapt from 61 basis points (bps) to 116 bps 
between 21 November 1997 (the last trading day before Yamaichi’s failure) and 30 
December 1997 (the last trading day of the year).  Although some hard medicine had 
been taken, more trouble would lie ahead. 
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Figure 5: 3-month Japanese Yen Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR): Q4 1997. Risk in the Japanese 
financial sector, as measured by the 3-month TIBOR during the fourth quarter of 1997, can be distinctly 
divided into two periods: before and after the Yamaichi failure on 24 November.  The Yamaichi crisis event 
pushed 3-month TIBOR above 60 basis points – and it remained elevated for the remainder of the year.  
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
More broadly, it can be implied that the Yamaichi failure was very influential in 
changing Japanese business culture.  The fact that the government let a large firm such as 
Yamaichi go under surely compelled other like firms that had not emphasized operating 
performance and/or were involved in less than ethical business practices to shape up.  
 
 
7.2 Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 
7.2.1 Background 
The thing is, they were “nice guys”.  Dawson (1999, p. 68) noted as much and pointed 
out that the “nice guys” moniker was exactly what rival firms used to describe Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan’s (LTCB) employees, who were laid-back and possessed a 
distaste for cutthroat competition.  Unfortunately, in the post-Big Bang world of high 
finance, such a reputation was probably, more than anything, a damning indictment of 
just how much of a dinosaur LTCB had become by the mid-1990’s.  For better or worse, 
“nice” LTCB would become the poster child for Japanese financial sector intervention in 
the thick of the banking crisis. 
Yamaichi fails 24-Nov-97 
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The story of LTCB closely mirrors the development of the Japanese economy since the 
end of the Second World War.  Perhaps this should not surprising since the LTCB was, 
after all, chartered by the government to provide long-term financing to key Japanese 
industries, and for many years it did so with success. The LTCB, along with the Industrial 
Credit Bank of Japan (and, later the Nippon Credit Bank), were unique organizations in 
Japanese finance.  Created through the Long-Term Credit Banking Law of 1952, these 
so-called “long-term credit banks” were initially the only banks allowed to issue long-
term loans to Japanese industry. In exchange for this exclusivity, these banks were not 
allowed to take short-term deposits and did not have retail branch networks.  The biggest 
purchaser of LTCB’s debentures was the Bank of Japan and, hence, the central bank 
became the LTCB’s primary source of capital.  The LTCB, in turn, channeled this capital 
sourced from the government by making loans to Japanese companies operating in fast-
expanding basic industries (Funding Universe, 2009). These companies often secured 
their loans with blocks of shares, which would net LTCB board representation in these 
very companies.  As the companies matured, they often repurchased their shares with 
cash, further bolstering LTCB’s growing capital base (Funding Universe, 2009). 
 
Through much of the Japanese economic miracle, the preferred form of financing for 
Japanese companies was bank loans and, as a result, the LTCB profited handsomely and 
expanded accordingly.  In essence, LTCB became one of the chief financiers to a blue 
chip client base that read like a “Who’s Who of Japan Inc.” (Dawson, 1999, p. 68).  
However, when the Japanese government began to slowly deregulate the financial sector 
in the early 1980s, the ground beneath LTCB’s privileged position soon shifted. 
 
Specifically, the newfound ability of Japanese companies to directly access debt and 
equity markets for financing meant that LTCB was forced to look for new ways to 
compete.  Margins were compressed to keep existing clients. Its traditionally 
conservative loan portfolio tilted toward a riskier brand of client – for instance, those 
active in the real estate, construction, services, and transportation industries.  Further, 
LTCB sought to increase its footprint in overseas markets. 
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7.2.2 “Crisis” Event: Causes and Description 
As long as the Japanese economy continued to boom, LTCB had no trouble riding the 
wave higher.  Indeed, during the bubble years, the bank experienced excellent growth. 
However, the bursting of the asset bubble around 1990 left the Japanese economy with a 
swath of businesses that could no longer pay back their loans, and banks such as LTCB 
were suddenly left “holding the bag.”  According to Fujii (2003, p. 14), banks that found 
themselves in similar situations in other developed economies would have more 
adamantly demanded repayment than those in Japan and, as a consequence, non-
performing borrowers would have been more apt to go bankrupt.  However, in Japan, 
corporate cultural pressures discouraged the banks from forcing their clients into 
bankruptcy since this would have caused mass unemployment – and thereby violated the 
(then unassailable) Japanese custom of providing lifetime employment for workers (Fujii, 
2003, p. 14).  Therefore, Japanese banks – LTCB included – simply shouldered the bad 
loans even though the likelihood of getting paid back was slim.  As the Japanese 
economic recession dragged on and worsened, so too, did the beleaguered balance sheets 
of the banks, which were soon drowning in red ink.   
Figure 6: Nikkei Bank Index Bubbles Up … and Down (1981-98). Once among the highest of high-flyers, 
the struggles of Japanese banks were reflected in their stock prices after the asset bubble burst. 
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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By 1995, conditions in the money markets strongly signaled of the severity of the 
situation for Japanese banks. For instance, Peek and Rosengren (1999, p. 1) noticed 
Japanese banks were paying higher interest rates vis-à-vis their American and European 
counterparts on interbank Eurodollar and Euroyen borrowings.   This meant the market, 
in effect, considered Japanese banks to be more risky than their global peers. 
Interestingly, this phenomenon was a 180-degree reversal from the 1980s, when Japanese 
banks benefited from high stock prices, low deposit rates, and favourable credit ratings, 
which afforded them the luxury of enjoying funding rates lower than those their global 
competitors (Peek and Rosengren, 1999, p. 1).   Further, the stock prices of Japanese 
financial institutions clearly reflected such an about-face in fortunes. 
 
Big Bang was introduced in 1996, providing the foundation for significant financial 
sector reform.  This was timely as the Asian Financial Crisis, which blew in like a 
cyclone in the summer of 1997, exacerbated contentious issues already prevalent in the 
battered Japanese financial sector.  These issues culminated in a particularly tense three-
week period in November 1997 when, in rapid-fire succession, Sanyo Securities 
(November 3), Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (November 17), and Yamaichi Securities 
(November 24) all collapsed.  But as bad as November 1997 proved to be, more pain was 
coming and bigger firms – like LTCB – were lodged squarely in the crosshairs. 
 
By 1998, LTCB’s solvency concerns were well known.  In its public filings, the bank had 
admitted to holding US$10 billion in non-performing loans on its balance sheet (BBC 
News, 1998).    Still, at the time, LTCB was the 10th largest bank in Japan (Dawson, 
1999, p. 68) and 22nd largest in the world in terms of assets.  Behind the scenes, the 
Ministry of Finance worked tirelessly to keep the bank from going under since its hefty 
size would certainly have implications for the greater economy. Merging LTCB with a 
stronger peer became a prime option and on 26 June 1998, it was announced that a 
merger between LTCB and the Osaka-based Sumitomo Trust and Banking was being 
considered.  However, messaging from the two financial institutions was inconsistent.  
LTCB insisted that any amalgamation would be a merger of equals.  Sumitomo seemed 
less keen, and openly suggested that LTCB was insolvent and government funds would 
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be needed for the deal to go through (Peek and Rosengren, 1999, p. 14).  No deal was 
immediately reached, and initial optimism that LTCB would be saved soon faded.  A 
subsequent announcement was made on 21 August 1998, when the Ministry of Finance 
advocated restructuring LTCB to make it a more palatable merger partner for Sumitomo 
(Peek and Rosengren, 1999, p. 14).   Judging from the immediate subsequent trading of 
banking stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, such an announcement did not exactly 
inspire confidence.   
Figure 7: The Nikkei Bank Index During LTCB’s Turbulent Summer 1998. LTCB’s troubles certainly 
affected the Japanese banking sector.  The announcement of a possible merger with Sumitomo buoyed 
some hope that LTCB would be saved at the end of June, but that hope was short-lived.  By the time the 
Ministry of Finance publicly floated the idea that LTCB should be restructured, investors in the banking 
sector were already heading for the exits, weighing the potentially ugly consequences of an LTCB failure. 
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
Fearing that LTCB’s legacy problems would prove an albatross around its neck, 
Sumitomo soon abandoned merger talks.  With no peer willing to play the role of white 
knight, LTCB was pushed to the brink of bankruptcy and appeared to be doomed.  Then, 
on 23 October 1998, the Japanese government surprised everyone and announced that 
LTCB would be nationalized. 
 
7.2.3 Market and Government Response 
With the bad loans on LTCB’s balance sheet piling up, the Japanese government had no 
choice but to undertake this unprecedented intervention. According to Landers (1998, p. 
LTCB – Sumitomo merger 
talks announced 26-Jun-98 
Ministry of Finance advocates 
LTCB restructuring 21-Aug-98 
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48), Prime Minister Obuchi had two reasons for using taxpayers’ money.  First, they were 
concerned that LTCB’s collapse might trigger a chain reaction, bringing down the entire 
Japanese financial system.  Second, if LTCB went down, the bank’s many troubled 
corporate borrowers might also go bust and the consequences would be devastating for 
the entire Japanese economy. 
 
The LTCB became the first firm to be nationalized under the provisions of the new Big 
Bang financial sector laws; the bank also had the dubious distinction of being the first 
bank to be nationalized in Japan’s postwar history (Daimon, 1998, p. 1). Nationalization 
of LTCB was intended to be temporary and on 28 October 1998, it was made official 
when all of the bank’s shares were acquired by the Deposit Insurance Corporation of 
Japan.  On 4 November 1998, a new management team with Takashi Anzai (a former 
Bank of Japan official) as president was appointed by DICJ following nomination by the 
Prime Minister (The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, 1999, p. 2). 
 
 
Figure 8: Japanese Equities in the Immediate Aftermath of LTCB’s Nationalization Announcement. 
Japanese equity markets responded negatively to the announcement of the government’s intention to 
nationalize LTCB.  On 26 October 1998, the first trading day after the news, the Nikkei Bank Index closed 
down -3.0%, and the Nikkei 225 down -2.1%.  By the end of the week, both indices had stabilized 
somewhat. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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The Nikkei 225 and Nikkei Bank Index fell -2.1% and -3.0%, respectively, on 26 October 
1998, the day after LTCB’s nationalization announcement. One-week to 30 October 
1998, the Nikkei 225 was down -4.1% and the Nikkei Bank Index had fallen -3.5%. 
 
Interestingly, risk in the money markets was largely unmoved by LTCB’s nationalization.  
In contrast to the Yamaichi failure in 1997, there was no discernible spike in the 3-month 
TIBOR, which only increased slightly from 69 bps to 75 bps between 23 October 1998 
(the last trading day before announcement of LTCB’s nationalization) and 30 December 
1998 (the last trading day of the year).  This perhaps suggested some measure of relief 
over the prevention of the negative spillovers of a possible LTCB bankruptcy, as well as 
confidence in the Japanese authorities’ decisive response and actions concerning the 
nationalization of LTCB.  In other words, the necessity of the LTCB nationalization 
ultimately proved to be another positive step in the quest to reform the Japanese financial 
sector. 
 
Figure 9: 3-month, Japanese Yen Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR): Q4 1998. Upon LTCB’s 
nationalization announcement, the Japanese money markets, as measured by the 3-month TIBOR, reacted 
with calm in contrast to the 1997 Yamaichi failure. The TIBOR remained in a tight range in the aftermath 
of the announcement.  In other words, there was no panic: this suggests that the Japanese authorities were 
making progress with respect to reforming the financial sector. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, 
Bloomberg. 
 
Under Japanese government stewardship, corporate restructuring of LTCB sought three 
basic objectives (The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, 1999, p. 2): 
The Japanese government 
announces that it will 
nationalize 23-Oct-98 
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• Early Emergence from Temporary Nationalization.  The Japanese government 
wanted the bank restructured and (re)privatized at the earliest possible date. 
• Reform of Operations and Improvement of Corporate Value. To improve the 
LTCB’s corporate value, non-performing loans were sectioned-off and sold to the 
Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC).  Further, the bank sought to 
improve its financial condition through streamlining business operations, reducing 
the number of employees, and disposing of certain properties. 
• Minimizing Costs to the Public. Sensitive to the political dimension of the 
nationalization, the government had a strong interest in having the LTCB 
maintain and enhance its corporate value such as to minimize the burden on 
taxpayers.  The LTCB was to strive to maintain a “superior customer base and 
asset portfolio”, in addition to developing better financial technologies and skills. 
 
In December 1998, the new management of the LTCB set up the Internal Investigation 
Committee, which was established to conduct investigations into the possible 
wrongdoing – and hence, the criminal and civil liability – of former LTCB executives 
(The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, 1999, p. 3).  After the investigation in June 1999, 
the committee filed a criminal complaint against the former executives, accusing them of 
falsifying the bank’s financial statements and illegally paying dividends to shareholders 
despite having insufficient profits (Japan Times, 1999).   This set the stage for Japanese 
law enforcement authorities to launch formal criminal investigations, which would later 
result in charges being laid.  It can be said that the willingness of the authorities to 
prosecute was significant for two reasons.  First, it sent a message to other executives of 
publicly traded companies that wrongdoing would be met with strong action.  Second, it 
helped to bolster flagging investor confidence. 
 
In order to expedite its eventual sale, LTCB hired an external financial advisor in 
February 1999.  Interestingly – and perhaps portending the makeup of the bank’s future 
owners – a foreign firm in New York-based Goldman Sachs was selected.  Indeed, in 
March 2000, with the blessing of the Financial Reconstruction Commission, the LTCB 
was sold to a consortium of investors led by US private equity firm Ripplewood 
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Holdings.  Other principal investors included many large, foreign financial institutions 
(Shinsei Bank, 2000, p. 6), but no firms in the investment consortium were Japanese.  It 
so happens that, the end of LTCB’s temporary nationalization would result in the creation 
of Japan’s first completely foreign-owned bank.  
 
The purchase price of the restructured LTCB was ¥120 billion (US$1.1 billion). In 
addition, in view of the large amount of losses incurred in the disposal of LTCB’s non-
performing assets, at the time of the termination of temporary nationalization, the bank 
made an application for financial assistance in the amount of ¥3,588 billion (US$36 
billion) from the Japanese government (Shinsei Bank, 2000, p. 6).  The amount was 
granted and, somewhat controversially, represented a sum of taxpayers’ money that 
would not be directly recovered.  Further, in order to bolster the amount of capital on 
LTCB’s balance sheet, the government agreed to purchase ¥240 billion (US$24 billion) 
worth of preferred stock (Shinsei Bank, 2000, p. 7).  
 
 
Figure 10: It Hasn’t Been Much Fun Being a Shinsei Bank Investor Since Its IPO. Since its IPO in 
early 2004, Shinsei Bank has failed to deliver returns to its investors.  Because of the high price of the IPO, 
the Japanese government was criticized for selling LTCB’s assets to Ripplewood Holdings at below market 
value.  Shinsei’s rather sorry performance since then has blunted much of that criticism.  Today, the re-
made bank is struggling through the current US-led financial crisis. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, 
Bloomberg.  
 
New ownership promptly renamed LTCB as Shinsei Bank (which means “new 
beginning”) and remade the financial institution in the image of a foreign-owned 
Choo, Page 38 
investment bank.  Additional restructuring was deemed successful and Ripplewood 
accelerated its Shinsei investment toward an initial public offering (IPO) in only four 
years. According to Leahy (2004, p.1), the IPO caused considerable controversy since it 
came so soon after the 2000 re-privatization, and also because it earned such stellar 
returns for the Ripplewood-led consortium.  The latter has given critics who say that Big 
Bang has only benefited foreign financial competition significant fodder.  This said, 
however, over the long run, the Shinsei IPO has proven to be a poor investment as the 
bank is now struggling through the current financial crisis.   
 
 
7.3 Lehman Brothers 
7.3.1 Background 
Big name, risky profile, and smallest of the major Wall Street brokerage firms – indeed, 
the parallels between Lehman Brothers and Yamaichi Securities are many. On 15 
September 2008, almost eleven years after the Yamaichi failure, the US Treasury 
Department made the difficult decision to let troubled Lehman slide into bankruptcy.  
With no bailout or rescue, Lehman’s failure stands as one of the key events in the US 
financial crisis so far. 
 
Things started to go wrong in the summer of 2007 when rival firm, Bear Stearns, was 
forced to liquidate two hedge funds that had invested in different types of mortgage-
backed securities, including those of the subprime variety (Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, 2009).  Proverbial canary in a coalmine – this was the first obvious signal that an 
inflection point had been reached for those who had bet heavily in what had been a 
roaring US housing market.  The decline had begun but the question, of course, was: just 
how severe would the decline be? 
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Figure 11: Tough Sledding for US Home Prices: The S&P Case/Shiller Home Price Index. A composite 
measure of US residential home prices in 20 metropolitan areas (Standard & Poor’s, 2009), the S&P 
Case/Shiller Home Price Index suggests that US real estate peaked in late 2005 (note that the index is 
calculated on a 3-month moving average).  The severe decline thereafter meant trouble for financial 
institutions like Lehman, which had bet heavily on a continued rise in prices.  Further, the tumbling real 
estate market also sideswiped the rest of the US economy. Quantitative data source: Standard & Poor’s.  
 
We now know that the answer is: very severe.  And for those firms such as Lehman that 
had based their previous outperformance on aggressive subsectors such as risky 
residential mortgages, such exposure would suddenly become a glaring Achilles’ heel. 
 
Financial market watchers knew that Lehman Brothers was a major player in the market 
for securitizing subprime and prime mortgages, and that as the smallest of the major Wall 
Street firms, it faced a larger risk that large losses could be fatal (New York Times, 2009).  
Few would have predicted the fall from grace could be so sudden, however.  Lehman’s 
bankruptcy set off tremors throughout the financial system that reverberate to this day. 
The uncertainty surrounding its billions of dollars of transactions with banks and hedge 
funds exacerbated a crisis of confidence that contributed to the freezing of credit markets 
that and forced governments around the world to take steps to try to calm panicked 
markets, including guaranteeing bank deposits (Story and White, 2008).   
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7.3.2 “Crisis” Event: Causes and Description 
With a varied and colourful history, Lehman is among the more interesting stories on 
Wall Street – and this was even before its collapse.  The Lehman Brothers that has been 
such a central part of the discussion in recent times, however, provides an archetypical 
example of the boom (and now, bust) US financial institution in the post-tech bubble and 
post-9/11 world, aggressively embracing “financial innovation” in a time of strong 
economic growth and, generally, geopolitical stability, to impressive operating results.   
Securitization of mortgages – and especially subprime mortgages – was a hot ticket, and 
Lehman parlayed their increasing involvement in this field into high fees and record 
profits.  For example, Lehman’s net income of US$1.3 billion during the second quarter 
of 2007, just prior to the unraveling of the subprime mortgage market, quadrupled its 
earnings of US$296 million back in the second quarter of 2002 (Lehman Brothers, 2009).  
Figure 12: Lehman Brothers, Selected Quarterly Financial Results. Lehman’s Fixed Income Capital 
Markets Division, which oversaw its mortgage-backed securitization business, drove the firm’s operating 
results in the post-9/11 environment. However, when the US real estate market plummeted, it became 
painfully evident that the model of securitization was a double-edged sword.  The effects of the subprime 
mortgage crisis began to show up in Lehman’s operating results by the third quarter of 2007 … before the 
end of the third quarter of 2008, the once-venerable investment bank had filed for bankruptcy protection.  
Quantitative data source: Lehman Brothers.  
 
Whether Lehman’s success begat complacency in areas such as risk-aversion and control 
is still up for debate, but what is clear is that Lehman, like many other firms involved in 
the same businesses, began to foray deeper into mortgages of the riskier subprime 
variety.  This was fine as long as the real estate market continued to rise. However, of 
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course, housing prices would peak in late 2005, and its subsequent decline would bring 
everyone and everything that had tied their success to real estate down with it.  As default 
rates on subprime mortgages soared, the overall US economy was sideswiped in the 
process as the housing industry slowed to a standstill and disposable income became 
scarce.  For financial institutions such as Lehman, cash flow from mortgages dried up and 
operating losses accelerated in disturbing fashion. 
 
Figure 13: From Hero to Zero: Lehman Brothers (2002-08). Once the subprime game was up, Lehman’s 
share price collapsed in dramatic fashion.  Two events involving Bear Sterns, a rival firm of Lehman, 
would ultimately prove catalysts for Lehman’s spectacular crash.  Quantitative data source: AIMCo, 
Bloomberg.   
 
As mentioned previously, the Bear Sterns incident with two of its hedge funds in July 
2007 became an early warning signal that the issues of subprime had come back to haunt 
those firms heavily involved with securitization.  For Lehman, losses from subprime 
mortgages began to negatively affect the bottom line in the third quarter of 2007 and 
would soon swamp the firm. 
 
The severity of the subprime crisis was made obvious when Lehman’s rival, Bear Sterns, 
was sold in what amounted to a fire sale to JPMorgan Chase on Sunday, 16 March 2008.  
As reported by Sorkin and Thomas (2008), what stunned the financial world was the 
price at which Bear Sterns was sold – US$2 per share or US$236 million.  Put in context, 
this price represented a jaw-dropping 93 percent discount to the US$30 per share at 
Bear Sterns forced to 
liquidate two hedge funds 
invested in MBS 
Bear Sterns sold at a 
bargain basement price to 
JPMorgan Chase 
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which Bear Sterns shares had closed only two days prior on Friday, 14 March 2008 
(Sorkin and Thomas, 2008).  To make matters worse, JPMorgan Chase only agreed to 
buy Bear Sterns after receiving US$30 billion in US government funding guarantees as a 
buffer for losses in the face of Bear’s staggering soured assets. 
 
With Bear Sterns briskly wiped from the financial map, Lehman Brothers was left 
standing as the most vulnerable of Wall Street’s independent brokerages.  Rumours 
swirled that Lehman was in similar dire straits. On Monday, 17 March 2008, the first 
trading day after the Bear Sterns takeover, Lehman shares closed down -19.1%.  Trouble 
was afoot. 
 
Still, when Lehman reported its First Quarter 2008 numbers the next day on Tuesday, 18 
March 2008, management put on a brave face. In the corresponding press release 
(Lehman Brothers, 2008), Lehman Chairman and CEO Richard S. Fuld, Jr., said: 
“In what remains a challenging operating environment, our results reflect the value of our 
continued commitment to building a diversified platform and our focus on managing risk 
and maintaining a strong capital and liquidity position. This strategy has allowed us to 
support our clients through these difficult and volatile markets, while continuing to build 
and strengthen our global franchise for our shareholders”. 
 
Net income for the quarter had come in at a disappointing US$489 million, less than half 
of the US$1.15 billion the firm had made during the first quarter of 2007. Further, 
although a profit of almost half a billion dollars seemed respectable on the surface, 
delving slightly deeper into Lehman’s financials uncovered that net revenues from its 
Fixed Income Capital Markets division – the division responsible for securitization of 
mortgages – had plunged 88% from the fiscal first quarter of 2007 (Lehman Brothers, 
2008).  
 
As the subprime mortgage crisis continued to worsen, behind closed doors Lehman 
management worked hard to raise additional capital to shore up the condition of its 
balance sheet.  Unfortunately, interested investors – not wanting to take on the likelihood 
of losses from Lehman’s mortgage-backed securities portfolio – were few and far 
between.  Time was ominously ticking. On 16 June 2008, Lehman announced its fiscal 
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second quarter results and the bottom line showed a net loss of -US$2.8 billion (Lehman 
Brothers, 2008).   Shockingly, its Fixed Income Capital Markets division recorded 
quarterly negative net revenue of -US$3.0 billion (Lehman Brothers, 2008).   
 
Unable to raise sufficient capital due to its plunging stock price and a dearth of willing 
investors, in July 2008 Lehman requested permission from US authorities to turn itself 
into a deposit-taking commercial bank.  Taking deposits would have improved the 
liquidity of Lehman’s balance sheet.  However, US authorities said no (Story and White, 
2008).  
 
As the subprime maelstrom continued to engulf other financial institutions, Lehman 
began to grow desperate.  The crisis of confidence that ensued would be the once-
venerable investment bank’s death knell.  On Thursday, 4 September 2008, JPMorgan, 
which handled Lehman’s trades, demanded that Lehman put up an additional US$5 
billion in cash and liquid securities due to its lack of confidence in Lehman’s ability to 
honour its obligations (Story and White, 2008).  Further, when GSEs Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were effectively nationalized by US authorities at very high cost on Sunday, 
7 September 2008, the likelihood of Lehman being bailed out by the US government 
dwindled considerably. 
 
On Wednesday, 10 September 2008, Lehman pre-announced its fiscal Third Quarter 
earnings.  A net loss of -US$3.9 billion was estimated (Lehman Brothers, 2008).  
Negative net revenues from its Fixed Income Capital Markets division came it at -US$4.6 
billion.  Mark-to-market adjustments (i.e., writedowns) on its residential mortgage-
related and commercial real estate positions totaled -US$7.0 billion.  With these results, 
most observers accepted that Lehman’s days as an independent brokerage firm were 
finished.  The question now, was if a buyer could be found to save Lehman from 
bankruptcy.    
 
US Treasury and Federal Reserve officials made it clear by the evening of Friday, 12 
September 2008 that no bailout would be forthcoming. Lehman’s frantic, last-ditch 
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efforts to sell itself to either the Bank of America or Barclays Bank over the weekend of 
13-14 September 2008 bore no fruit when both potential buyers walked away and, with a 
thud, Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection on Monday, 15 September 2008.  
 
7.3.3 Market and Government Response 
Much like with Japan and Yamaichi a decade earlier, US authorities decided that, in spite 
of its name and status as a fixture on Wall Street, Lehman Brothers wasn’t too big to fail.  
It is possible that after the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a week before, 
the US Treasury didn’t feel that it had the political capital to also bailout Lehman.  Also, 
US authorities may have felt the need to draw “a line in the sand”, fearing that moral 
hazard was pervasive in the US financial system.  In other words, Lehman was made an 
example of by the US authorities. 
 
Figure 14: US Equities in the Immediate Aftermath of Lehman’s Failure. Confusion and volatility 
reigned during the week after Lehman’s failure, as evidenced by wildly gyrating US equity markets. Initial 
fright gave way to speculation that a sweeping rescue plan would be implemented quickly by US 
policymakers.  Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
Market reaction to the Lehman failure can best be described as frenetic and volatile.  On 
15 September 2008, the broad-based, benchmark Standard & Poor’s 500 Index slid -4.7% 
and the KBW Bank Index, a measure of the financial sector, tumbled -8.4%.  However, 
by the end of the week, speculation that US authorities would come through with a 
sweeping rescue plan for the faltering financial sector encouraged the S&P 500 to recover 
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its losses (+0.3%, 1-week return to 19 September) and the KBW Bank Index to soar 
(+16.3%, 1-week return to 19 September). 
 
Meanwhile, the money markets were signaling big trouble. The TED spread, a measure 
of risk in the banking system, spiked 66 bps to 201 bps on Monday, 15 September 2008.  
All-out panic ensued as by Thursday, 18 September 2008, the TED spread had soared to 
313 bps.  
 
 
Figure 15: Risk (Fear) in the Global Banking System: The TED Spread. The TED Spread spiked 
alarmingly when Lehman failed, pushing the needle well into crisis country, if it wasn’t already there.  
Fumbling by US policymakers in the weeks following only made it worse.  In retrospect, one wonders if the 
initial rejection by US Congress of the Treasury department’s draft rescue package legislation on Monday, 
29 September 2008 unnecessarily exacerbated an already nasty situation.  Quantitative data source: 
AIMCo, Bloomberg.   
 
Critics such as Krugman (2008) harangue the US administration for not having a more 
coherent plan of action ready in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman failure, and 
surely, there were stumbles along the way as US Treasury scrambled to put together a 
rescue package when it became apparent that the Lehman fiasco had accelerated a global 
credit crunch. The politics of a rescue package for banks, however, proved highly 
unpopular among a public that was losing their homes, and US Congress rejected 
legislation submitted by US Treasury requesting authority to purchase troubled assets 
from financial institutions on Monday, 29 September 2008.  In retrospect, this political 
Lehman goes bankrupt 
US Congress rejects initial 
rescue package for banks 
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posturing by the politicians made the burgeoning crisis much worse if market reactions 
were any indication.  By the time the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
was signed into law on Friday, 3 October 2008, many were left wondering about the 
extent of the damage caused by questionable leadership shown by US authorities in the 
weeks following Lehman’s demise.  
 
 
7.4 Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) 
7.4.1 Background 
Created by government charter, instrumental to the financial system due to its scale and 
breadth of operations, and eventually befalling to a similar fate after failing as a publicly-
traded company, there are enough parallels between Fannie Mae and the Long-Term 
Credit Bank of Japan to make for intriguing comparison. Fannie Mae was initially created 
by the Roosevelt Administration during the Great Depression to ensure that sufficient 
funds were available to mortgage lenders (New York Times, 2009).  In 1968, the entity 
was re-chartered by Congress and made into a publicly traded company; Freddie Mac, 
another so-called government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) with the same mandate, was 
created in 1970 to provide competition for Fannie Mae (New York Times, 2009).  And 
thus began the strange, confused accountability of Fannie Mae – though technically for-
profit with publicly traded shares, it also served a public policy function that was 
considered integral by the government.  This confused accountability would later come 
back to haunt. 
 
To date, the raison d’être of Fannie Mae has been little changed. Its primary function is to 
operate in the secondary mortgage markets though the purchase and securitization of 
home mortgages, thereby ensuring that other US financial institutions (such as banks or 
mortgage brokers) have access to sufficient funds and liquidity in order to, in turn, lend to 
American homebuyers at affordable rates (Fannie Mae, 2009). The mortgages that Fannie 
Mae purchases are then either held in investment portfolios or packaged and resold as 
mortgage-backed securities to investors. 
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As such, Fannie Mae is a vital cog in the securitization of mortgages and, along with 
Freddie Mac, the two GSEs are estimated to have underwritten nearly half of the US’s 
US$12 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt (Seager and Inman, 2008). To provide frame 
of reference for the scale of Fannie’s and Freddie’s operations, the sum of US$12 trillion 
is roughly twice the GDP of the United Kingdom (Elliott, 2008).   
 
7.4.2 “Crisis” Event: Causes and Description 
With respect to the securitization in which Fannie Mae was heavily involved, this 
“innovation” in financial engineering has become exponentially more prevalent over the 
past couple of decades. Sule (2009, p. 44) notes that prior to the widespread use of 
securitization and credit derivatives, banks would create mortgage loans and then retain 
the credit risk of these loans on their balance sheets until the loans matured or were paid 
off.    However, securitization became a boon for the banks since they were able to 
offload the credit risks of these asset-backed securities to interested investors and, in turn, 
free up capital on their balance sheets to restructure and redistribute further pools of 
mortgages and other loans (Sule, 2009, p. 44).   In other words, securitization could be 
viewed as a form of off-balance sheet transaction that allowed them to further leverage 
their operations – and potentially, their earnings. 
 
Essentially, Fannie Mae was a “middleman” in the securitization process.  Because the 
market considered Fannie a quasi-government agency due to its public policy mandate, 
the firm was able to borrow at preferential rates in debt markets and use these funds to 
purchase mortgages from banks, securitize them, and re-sell them to interested yield-
starved investors such as insurance companies and pension funds (Mann, 2004).  Fannie 
Mae provided a guarantee to these investors that they would be provided with interest and 
principal mortgage payments, regardless of defaults in the underlying mortgages.  For its 
securitization services, Fannie pocketed high fees and spreads in the process, much to the 
delight of its shareholder base.  As comfort levels with securitization increased, subprime 
mortgages began to surface in increasing numbers in Fannie’s mortgage pools. This 
meant even higher profits – as long as the real estate market kept going up.  
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Figure 16: Fannie Mae: Quarterly Net Income (Loss). The surreal level of losses during the final two 
quarters of 2008 (picked up at the expense of the US taxpayer) dwarf Fannie Mae’s earnings prior to the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market. As it is, the price of greed, poor accountability and insufficient 
regulatory oversight in the financial sector is very high. Quantitative data source: Fannie Mae. 
 
However, as previously written, when US housing prices peaked in late 2005, the 
unraveling of the subprime mortgage market was fast and brutal.  When default rates 
soared, mortgage-backed securities became worthless, and suddenly Fannie Mae – the 
biggest guarantor for mortgages in the United States – was on the hook.   
 
It can be argued that Fannie Mae’s foray into risky subprime securitization is attributable 
to its muddled governance structure.  As a GSE, the market consistently bet (and it was 
right, as it turns out) that the US government would never let Fannie fail. Even before the 
perils of subprime, commentators such as Mann (2004) raised red flags at Fannie Mae’s 
unrivaled lobbying power in Washington DC, which was successful in keeping rigorous 
regulatory oversight at bay.  Further, as a stockholder-owned, publicly traded 
corporation, Fannie’s goal was to maximize quarterly profits, upon which management 
bonuses were also based.  The combination of these factors made Fannie Mae a perfect 
storm of moral hazard – it was poorly regulated and its political connections kept it that 
way, management was motivated to maximize short-term profit with an implicit backstop 
provided by the US taxpayer, and its public policy mandate could be influenced by near-
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term political whims with little regard to the long-term sustainability of the US financial 
system. 
 
Figure 17: Fannie Mae’s Tumbling Fall (2007-08). The collapse of the US housing market also caused a 
corresponding tumble in Fannie Mae’s share price. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
As the subprime mortgage crisis worsened considerably during Summer 2008, Fannie 
Mae’s ridiculously levered balance plunged into serious risk – and Fannie’s tumbling 
share price reflected this.  On 13 July 2008, in a vain attempt to assuage a nervous 
market, the US Treasury Department announced a temporary increase in the credit lines 
of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was 
authorized to lend to both GSEs should such lending be necessary (Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, 2009).  Foreshadowing things to come, on 30 July 2008, the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 was signed into law which, among other things, 
authorized the US Treasury to purchase GSE obligations and reform the regulatory 
supervision of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the new Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2009). 
 
 
7.4.3 Market and Government Response 
Fearing that Fannie and Freddie could no longer meet its obligations, the US Treasury 
department made the decision to place both GSEs into conservatorship on 7 September 
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2008, thereby effectively nationalizing the two firms.  According to the New York Times 
(2009), the rescue represented an extraordinary federal intervention and has the potential 
to be one of the most expensive in history. The rescue plan for Fannie and Freddie has 
committed the government to provide as much as US$100 billion to each GSE to 
backstop any shortfalls in capital (New York Times, 2009). 
Figure 18: US Equities in the Immediate Aftermath of Fannie Mae’s Nationalization. Equity markets 
breathed a sigh of relief upon announcement of Fannie’s (and Freddie’s) placement into conservatorship 
on 7 September 2008. However, initial optimism diminished quickly as the week progressed, just prior to 
the Lehman failure. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg.  
 
 
The nationalization announcement proved correct the market’s assumption that the GSEs 
would never be allowed to fail and, at least in the immediate aftermath, equity markets 
responded in relief.  On Monday, 8 September 2008, the S&P 500 Index increased +2.1% 
and the KBW Bank Index jumped +6.9%.  By the end of the week, these gains had 
moderated, with the S&P 500 registering a weekly gain of only +0.8% and the KBW 
Bank Index up +3.2%. 
 
In contrast, risk in the money market remained elevated after the Fannie nationalization 
announcement.  The calculated TED Spread increased slightly by 8 bps (from 104 bps on 
Friday, 5 September 2008 to 112 bps) on Monday, 8 September 2008. As the week 
progressed, the TED Spread climbed to 135 basis points by Friday, 12 September 2008, 
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an indicator of heightened risk awareness in the money market.   The Lehman fiasco 
during the weekend of 13-14 September 2008 would confirm these suspicions. 
 
 
Figure 19: The TED Spread: 5-19 September 2008. Unlike the equity market’s initial optimism after the 
Fannie nationalization announcement, risk awareness in the money markets remained heightened during 
the trading week of 8-12 September 2008. The fallout from the Lehman failure during the weekend of 13-14 
September 2008 proved these suspicions correct as the TED spread widened considerably thereafter. 
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
In November 2008, US Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson (2008) was quoted as 
saying: “ … failure of the GSEs posed a huge risk to our financial system. We couldn't 
wait for them to fail formally.”  Indeed.  But now a ward of the state, US taxpayers are 
paying dearly for Fannie’s mistakes, highlighting the egregiousness of its actions, and the 
gaping holes in its governance.  
 
 
8 Discussion and Data Analysis 
8.1 Yamaichi Securities vs. Lehman Brothers 
Yamaichi and Lehman share many commonalities (refer to Appendix C: Summary of 
Case Studies, for a direct table comparison). Both were prestigious names with storied 
histories, among the largest independent brokerage firms in their home countries and, 
most importantly for the purposes of this research study, were allowed to fail by 
  
 
Fannie 
nationalized 
  
  Lehman 
bankrupt 
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government authorities when each firm’s actions put their respective businesses in 
serious trouble. A comparison of both the market and government responses, as well as a 
summary of key takeaways follow.   
 
8.1.1 Market Response 
As per the research methodology section, three key parameters for comparison in this 
thesis are short-term reactions in (1) the money markets as measured by the TIBOR and 
the TED Spread; (2) financial sector equities as measured by the Nikkei Bank Index and 
the KBW Bank Index; and (3) general equities as measured by the Nikkei 225 Index and 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. These measures are compared against one another in 
the immediate aftermath of each firm’s crisis event (i.e., bankruptcy) and each 
government’s course of action (i.e., letting the firm fail).  The immediate aftermath here 
is defined as the changes in the denoted indices within a one-week period (trading days 
only and exclusive of weekends and holidays).  
 
Figure 20: Yamaichi vs. Lehman: Money Markets, TIBOR & TED Spread. As one can see from the 
graph above, risk in the money markets – an indicator of financial crises – increased in the immediate 
aftermath of both the Yamaichi and Lehman failures.  However, the leap in the TED Spread after Lehman’s 
failure is decidedly more significant than the corresponding jump in the TIBOR after Yamaichi’s failure 
(over a doubling in Lehman’s case at T+4 vs. an increase of about 50% in Yamaichi’s case).  This suggests 
that the panic level was more pronounced in the US situation.  It can be argued that the respective 
government responses (see corresponding subsection below) in each case may have impacted, at least in 
part, the differences in reaction in the money markets. Further, it is possible that the Japanese Labor Day 
Holiday (denoted at T+1 in the Yamaichi case) before trading resumed may have allowed cooler heads to 
prevail. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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Figure 21: Yamaichi vs. Lehman: Financial Equities, Nikkei Bank Index & KBW Bank Index. Both the 
Nikkei Bank Index (-7.7%) and the KBW Bank Index (-8.4%) fall precipitously in the first trading days after 
the respective crises events of Yamaichi Securities and Lehman Brothers. In the Japanese situation, as the 
week progresses, initial losses are recovered as investors in the financial sector gain confidence in 
Japanese authorities’ determination to adhere to the principles of Big Bang, “let capitalism work”, and not 
return to the old convoy system.  The US situation is marked with extreme volatility and, as the week 
progresses, speculators in the financial sector bet that US authorities will quickly have in place a 
comprehensive financial sector rescue plan. In a sense, the speculators are proven wrong as US authorities 
fumble politically with the proposed rescue plan and do not implement it until weeks after the fact. 
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg.   
 
 
Figure 22: Yamaichi vs. Lehman: General Equities, Nikkei 225 Index and S&P 500 Index. Initial 
negative reactions in both the Nikkei 225 (-5.1%) and the S&P 500 (-4.7%) are not unexpected.  Both 
indices recover as the week progresses – the Nikkei 225 because investors gain confidence in Japanese 
authorities’ determination to adhere to the principles of Big Bang; the S&P 500 on the hopes of a 
comprehensive US rescue package.  There is an irony here – the Japanese market moves because the 
Japanese are letting capitalism work; the US market moves in the belief of more intervention. Quantitative 
data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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8.1.2 Government Response 
In both the Yamaichi and Lehman cases, the government responses were similar: the 
authorities decided to stand by and let the venerable names go under.  It was deemed, at 
the time, that the failure of the firms would not have profound effects on the rest of the 
financial sector and economy as a whole.  However, with the benefit of hindsight, it 
would appear that the US government’s handling of the Lehman failure pushed the global 
financial sector to edge of disaster. 
 
The Japanese government’s crisis control in the wake of the Yamaichi’s failure appears 
superior to the US government’s confused handling of the Lehman situation.  Japan stuck 
to the principles of Big Bang and focused its communications on the protection of 
investors.  Japan was seen to be taking hard (but needed) medicine by letting the markets 
work, punishing a mismanaged Yamaichi.  On the other hand, in the US situation, 
financial sector conditions (and confidence) had worsened so quickly that things may 
have been needlessly made worse when the US government did not appear to have a 
credible plan in place immediately after the Lehman bankruptcy.  Surely, the US political 
response was disappointing and, indeed, dangerous. 
 
8.1.3 Key Takeaways 
Key takeaways from the Yamaichi and Lehman cases may be summarized as follows. 
• The market must be allowed to punish poorly managed firms, as illustrated with 
the case of Yamaichi.  However, authorities must communicate clear direction in 
the wake of such failures. The Japanese had a plan in place in the aftermath of the 
Yamaichi failure (Big Bang and an emphasis on investor protection) and markets 
did not panic as a result.  In contrast, the Americans had no definite plan after 
Lehman’s failure, and may have done an awful disservice to the financial sector 
and the global economy by mishandling the situation. 
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• For the sake of market and consumer confidence, financial regulations must be 
kept current with market developments and be stringently enforced to discourage 
against wrongdoing and unethical behaviour.  Yamaichi’s involvement with the 
tobashi scheme is one example of how such wrongdoing is damaging to 
confidence. 
• Governments must be willing to undertake bold action to reform weaknesses in 
the ever-changing financial sector, even if such measures are politically 
unpopular.  Big Bang and the job losses associated with the Yamaichi failure were 
unpopular but they needed to happen.  Getting a financial sector rescue plan in 
place in the US – also highly unpopular – was unnecessarily delayed by ill-
informed political posturing.  
• Prudential rules concerning the solvency of financial institutions must be 
rigorously enforced, given the central role that banks and financial companies 
play in a modern economy.  The speed of Lehman’s fall from grace suggests that 
more may need to be done with respect to evaluating the off-balance sheet 
transactions of financial companies. 
 
 
8.2 Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan vs. Federal National Mortgage Association 
Like Yamaichi and Lehman, LTCB and Fannie Mae also share many similarities (refer to 
Appendix C: Summary of Case Studies, for a table comparison). Both were initially 
chartered to serve important public policy functions, eventually evolved into shareholder-
owned and stock exchange-listed entities and, most importantly for the purposes of this 
research study, both were effectively nationalized by government authorities. A 
comparison of both the market and government responses, as well as a summary of key 
takeaways follow.  
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8.2.1 Market Response 
As per the research methodology section, three key parameters for comparison in this 
thesis are short-term reactions in (1) the money markets as measured by the TIBOR and 
the TED Spread; (2) financial sector equities as measured by the Nikkei Bank Index and 
the KBW Bank Index; and (3) general equities as measured by the Nikkei 225 Index and 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index. These measures are compared against one another in 
the immediate aftermath of each firm’s crisis event and consequent government action 
(i.e., nationalization). The immediate aftermath is defined as the changes in the indices 
within a one-week period (trading days only and exclusive of weekends and holidays).  
 
Figure 23: LTCB vs. Fannie Mae: Money Markets, TIBOR & TED Spread. The Japanese money 
markets, as measured by TIBOR, barely flinched in the days after the announcement of LTCB’s 
nationalization – there definitely was no panic. The Japanese government’s well-defined plan for LTCB 
may have assuaged fears in the market.  In contrast, Fannie Mae’s nationalization announcement caused a 
moderate increase in the TED Spread, as participants in the money markets priced in the expectation of 
greater risk. They were proven correct, as the Lehman failure occurred the following week and panic 
ensued. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
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Figure 24: LTCB vs. Fannie Mae: Financial Equities, Nikkei Bank Index & KBW Bank Index. On the 
day following LTCB’s nationalization announcement, the Nikkei Bank Index fell (-3.0%) then quickly 
stabilized – similar to the money markets, there was no real panic.  Fannie Mae’s nationalization was met 
with initial relief in the KBW Bank Index (+6.9%) but trading remained volatile as financial sector 
investors and speculators tried to properly gauge the environment while other firms (i.e., Lehman) 
remained in compromising states. Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg. 
 
 
Figure 25: LTCB vs. Fannie Mae: General Equities, Nikkei 225 Index and S&P 500 Index.  Japanese 
equities, as measured by the Nikkei 225, closed down moderately (-2.1%) in the wake of the LTCB 
nationalization announcement and continued to trend slightly downward as the week progressed.  Moves in 
the S&P 500 were similarly moderate after the Fannie Mae nationalization announcement (+2.1%) and 
chopped in mixed trading during the week.  In both situations, a wait-and-see attitude tended to prevail. 
Quantitative data source: AIMCo, Bloomberg.  
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8.2.2 Government Response 
In both the LTCB and Fannie Mae cases, the government responses were similar.  Seeing 
that the firms were too large and too integral to the financial sector as a whole to fail, 
both the Japanese and US governments made the difficult decisions to nationalize the 
respective financial companies at great expense to the taxpayer. To the Japanese 
government’s credit, an immediate nationalization plan for LTCB was put in place from 
the beginning, which helped to instill confidence and avert panic.  In Fannie Mae’s 
situation, the US government simply had no choice – a Fannie Mae default would have 
had a devastating impact on the financial sector and economy as a whole.  However, the 
future path for Fannie Mae is still unclear as US authorities continue to analyze the 
GSE’s options. 
 
8.2.3 Key Takeaways 
Key takeaways from the LTCB and Fannie Mae cases may be summarized as follows: 
• Where a financial institution’s viability as a going concern will have a significant 
impact on the health of the financial sector and economy as a whole, authorities 
must be willing to take dramatic and expensive measures (i.e., taking an equity 
stake, nationalization), even if such measures are politically unpalatable. LTCB’s 
nationalization provides a textbook case, as does that of Fannie Mae. 
• Communicating a clear action plan in the face of extraordinary intervention pays 
dividends in terms of calming the market and instilling confidence as evidenced 
by the Japanese government’s handling of the LTCB nationalization. 
• However, extraordinary government intervention should be used judiciously, and 
only where necessary, so as not to exacerbate the potential for moral hazard. 
• There is reason to support the notion that firms that have become “too big to fail” 
may also be “too big to make all of their own decisions.”  
• The management of a financial institution (and any publicly traded company, for 
that matter) must be taken to task if its public disclosure is inaccurate, as was the 
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case with LTCB.  The significance of consumer and market confidence cannot be 
overstated and accurate disclosure is essential.  
• Prudential rules concerning the solvency of financial institutions must be 
rigorously enforced. The speed of Fannie Mae’s staggering collapse suggest that 
more may need to be done with respect to evaluating the off-balance sheet 
transactions of financial companies. 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
In the current US financial crisis, much of the interventionist action taken by US 
authorities has proven to be politically unpopular.  The question is raised: why is the 
financial sector, and its apparent bad, risky behaviour being bailed out while homeowners 
and other sectors are largely being left to fend for themselves?  The answer likely lies in 
the fact that today’s global, capitalist system runs on the confidence of its participants – 
and a healthy financial sector is critical to the smooth functioning of the modern 
economy.  In essence, to make an analogy, if the economy as a whole is like the body of a 
person, then the financial sector is like the oxygen.  Although being able to breathe does 
not necessarily make a patient healthy (one might say that the Japanese economy since its 
banking crisis may be a bit like this), not having any oxygen available is guaranteed to 
bode badly for the patient.   As such, the US patient, as it were, is currently getting the 
respirator treatment – even though in the eyes of many, it doesn’t quite seem fair.  
 
Whether the efforts of the US authorities are going to make a difference by either 
reducing the severity of the current recession and/or shortening its duration is still to be 
determined.  Relative to the Japanese situation, the Americans have undoubtedly acted 
faster though, interestingly, many of the measures implemented to date bear a striking 
resemblance to the approaches taken in Japan.  Certainly, heavy criticism was leveled at 
Japan for its handling of the banking crisis but given current events, maybe they didn’t 
get it so wrong after all.  
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Japan’s approaches toward Yamaichi Securities and LTCB – with the clear 
communication of action plans being especially noteworthy – have provided significant 
templates for cleaning up messes in the financial sector.  The US experience with 
Lehman Brothers and Fannie Mae provides evidence that financial history doesn’t 
necessarily repeat itself, but it does tend to rhyme.   In these time of crisis, it would seem 
that acknowledgement of such an assertion provides foundation for designing a better-
functioning financial system when the prospects of such opportunity appear ripe on the 
vine. After all, the well-being of literally billions around the globe hang in the balance, 
underscoring the great responsibility of policymakers to get it right.    
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10 Appendix A: Japanese Banking Crisis Timeline  
Date Event 
29 December 1989 The Nikkei 225 Index peaks at 38.915.87 points. 
8 February 1994 After several years of economic malaise, the Japanese government introduces a 
¥15.25 trillion economic package.  
30 August 1995 Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit Cooperative fail. 
11 November 1996 Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Prime Minister at the time, introduces the Japanese Big 
Bang – nomenclature for extensive financial system reform. The Big Bang is to be 
based on the principles of free markets, fair trade backed by transparent and 
reliable rules, and global standards. 
21 November 1996 The Japanese government orders the suspension of business at Hanwa Bank. 
Summer 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
3 November 1997 Sanyo Securities, a middle-sized securities firm, files for bankruptcy protection. 
17 November 1997 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank fails. 
24 November 1997 Yamaichi Securities, one of Japan’s Big Four securities firms, announces that it is 
effectively bankrupt and is ceasing operations.  The Japanese government decides 
to stand by while Yamaichi goes under.  
16 February 1998 The Japanese Diet passes the Financial Function Stabilization Law and the Deposit 
Insurance Law.  The new laws allow the government to use ¥30 trillion of public 
funds for the purposes of stabilizing the financial sector (¥17 trillion for protecting 
depositors of failed banks and ¥13 trillion for bank recapitalization).  
March 1998 The government uses ¥1.8 trillion out of the ¥13 trillion available for bank 
recapitalization. 
23 October 1998 Teetering on collapse, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan is nationalized by the 
Japanese government under new legislation that contains provisions to deal with 
both undercapitalized and insolvent financial institutions.  
15 December 1998 Financial Reconstruction Commission is established. 
March 1999 Second major recapitalization of banks (in the sum of ¥7.5 trillion) through the use 
of mostly preferred share purchases occurs through the auspices of the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission.   
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11 Appendix B: US Financial Crisis Timeline 
Date Event 
Late 2005 After an unprecedented boom, US residential home prices peak and begin to fall 
precipitously.  
31 July 2007 One of the largest independent US investment banks, Bear Sterns, is forced to 
liquidate two hedge funds that invested in various types of mortgage-backed 
securities. 
12 December 2007 The US Federal Reserve creates the Term Auction Facility (TAF), in which fixed 
amounts of term funds will be auctioned to financial institutions against a wide 
variety of collateral.  In essence, this provides institutions in need with liquidity 
(i.e., cash) in the face of other non-performing assets. 
21 December 2007 Only nine days after its creation, the Federal Reserve confirms that Term Auction 
Facility auctions will be conducted for as long as financial market conditions 
require.  
11 January 2008 Bank of America, the second largest bank in the US, announces it will purchase 
Countrywide Financial, a large and troubled mortgage lender, in a transaction 
worth US$4 billion. 
17 February 2008 British mortgage lender Northern Rock is nationalized by Her Majesty’s Treasury 
of the United Kingdom. 
7 March 2008 Financial market troubles continue to intensify.  The Federal Reserve announces 
US$50 billion Term Auction Facility auctions on 10 March and 24 March, and 
further extends the program for at least an additional six months. 
11 March 2008 More proactive maneuvering from the Federal Reserve.  To further ensure liquidity 
for financial institutions, the US central bank announces the creation of the Term 
Securities Lending Facility, which will lend up to U$200 billion of Treasury 
securities against a variety of securities eligible for collateral including both federal 
agency and private label mortgage-backed securities. 
16 March 2008 JPMorgan Chase, the third largest bank in the US, acquires Bear Sterns, which has 
been ravaged by its exposure to subprime mortgage securities, for approximately 
$236 million or just $2 a share.  The bargain-basement price sends shockwaves 
reverberating throughout the financial world as Bear Sterns stock had closed at $30 
on its last trading day (Friday, 14 March 2008).  To make matters worse, JPMorgan 
Chase only agreed to the takeover after receiving $30 billion of US federal 
government funding guarantees as a buffer in the face of Bear Sterns’ staggering 
soured assets. 
2 May 2008 In a sign that market conditions are badly worsening, the Federal Open Market 
Committee expands the list of eligible collateral for Term Securities Lending 
Facility auctions to include asset-backed securities, in addition to already eligible 
residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and agency collateralized 
mortgage obligations.  The Federal Reserve further expands Term Auction Facility 
auctions from US$50 billion to US$75 billion. 
9 June 2008 Lehman Brothers announces losses of US$2.8 billion for its fiscal second quarter. 
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Date Event 
11 July 2008 The US Office of Thrift Supervision closes IndyMac Bank, one of the country’s 
largest savings and loan associations.  At the time of its failure, IndyMac 
constitutes the fourth largest bank failure in US history. 
13 July 2008 The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
lend to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should such lending be necessary.  Further, 
the US Treasury Department announces a temporary increase in the credit lines of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in addition to the power to purchase equity in either 
GSE should the need arise. 
15 July 2008 Short sellers speculating on the continued plummeting of shares in financial 
institutions pile on the misery. By borrowing shares of companies to sell on the 
open market in the hopes of buying them back at a lower price at a later date, stock 
prices of financial institutions fall even further.  In a surprise move, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission grants a reprieve for the financial institutions 
by issuing an emergency order temporarily prohibiting the naked short selling in 
the securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and primary dealers at commercial and 
investment banks. 
30 July 2008 US President George W. Bush signs into law the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 which, among other things, authorizes the US Treasury Deparmtent to 
purchase GSE obligations and reforms regulatory supervision of GSEs under a new 
federal housing agency.  The foundation is in place to nationalize troubled Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, should the need arise. 
8 September 2008 The US government effectively nationalizes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  There 
is speculation that the enormous cost of doing so may makes it extremely unlikely 
that teetering Lehman Brothers will be bailed out. 
10 September 2008 Lehman pre-announces a massive US$3.9 billion loss for the fiscal third quarter.  
CEO Richard Fuld, Jr. says the firm will consider all “strategic alternatives”, which 
is Wall Street code for the active pursuing a sale of the company. 
12 September 2008 Top Wall Street executives meet on Friday night to discuss ways to resolve the 
crisis.  The Fed and the Treasury signal that the government will not use taxpayer 
money to facilitate a takeover of Lehman. 
14 September 2008 Barclays Bank abandons a potential bid for Lehman. Bank of America also leaves 
Lehman talks, instead agreeing to buy Merrill Lynch, the largest US retail 
brokerage, for US$50 billion. 
15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
25 September 2008 The Office of Thrift Supervision closes Washington Mutual Bank, the largest 
savings and loans association (and sixth-largest bank) in the country. 
29 September 2008 Influenced by public opinion, the US House of Representatives rejects legislation 
submitted by the US Treasury Department requesting authority to purchase 
troubled assets from financial institutions.  Markets tumble worldwide. 
3 October 2008 Congress passes and President Bush signs into law the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, which establishes the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief 
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Date Event 
Program (TARP). 
8 October 2008 The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
borrow up to $37.8 billion in investment-grade, fixed-income securities from 
American International Group (AIG) in return for cash collateral. 
14 October 2008 US Treasury announces the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that will 
purchase capital in financial institutions under the authority of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The US Treasury will make available $250 
billion of capital to US financial institutions. This facility will allow banking 
organizations to apply for a preferred stock investment by the US Treasury. 
Publicly, the plan proves to be very politically unpopular. 
14 November 2008 US Treasury purchases a total of $33.5 billion in preferred stock in 21 US banks 
under the Capital Purchase Program. 
21 November 2008 The US Treasury Department purchases an additional $3 billion in preferred stock 
in 23 US banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
5 December 2008 The US Treasury Department purchases an additional $4 billion in preferred stock 
in 35 US banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
12 December 2008 The US Treasury Department purchases an additional $6.25 billion in preferred 
stock in 35 US banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
19 December 2008 The US Treasury Department purchases an additional $27.9 billion in preferred 
stock in 49 US banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
23 December 2008 The US Treasury Department purchases an additional $15.1 billion in preferred 
stock in 49 US banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
12 January 2009 At the request of incoming President Barrack Obama, President Bush submits a 
request to Congress for the remaining US$350 billion in TARP funding for use by 
the incoming administration. 
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12 Appendix C: Summary of Case Studies 
 Yamaichi 
Securities 
Lehman Brothers Long-Term 
Credit Bank of 
Japan 
Fannie Mae 
Domicile Japan 
 
US Japan US 
Founded 1897  
 
1850 1952 1938  
Description, Prior 
to Crisis Event 
Securities 
Brokerage Firm / 
Investment Bank  
Securities 
Brokerage Firm / 
Investment Bank 
Long-Term Credit 
Bank 
Secondary 
Mortgage Market 
Liquidity Provider 
(Publicly-Traded 
Government-
Sponsored 
Enterprise)  
 
Background, 
Prior to Crisis 
Event 
Prestigious name, 
storied history. 
 
One of Japan’s 
“Big Four” 
brokerage firms 
(along with 
Nomura, Nikko, 
Daiwa). 
 
Smallest firm of 
the Big Four. 
 
 
Prestigious name, 
storied history. 
 
One of the US’s 
big five 
independent 
brokerage firms 
(along with 
Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, 
Merrill Lynch, 
Bear Sterns). 
 
Second-smallest 
firm of the five 
biggest 
independents 
(smallest, after the 
takeover of Bear 
Stearns by 
JPMorgan Chase 
in March 2008). 
 
Initially created by 
government 
charter to serve a 
vital public 
function (financing 
basic industries 
through exclusive 
license to issue 
long-term 
debentures). 
 
Listed on the 
Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and 
publicly-traded 
since 1970. 
Initially created by 
government 
charter to serve a 
vital public 
function (ensuring 
the availability of 
sufficient funds 
and liquidity to 
mortgage lenders, 
thereby indirectly 
enabling more 
financing options 
to encourage home 
ownership). 
 
Converted into a 
publicly-traded, 
shareholder-owned 
corporation in 
1968 and listed on 
the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
 
Success Factors 
During Boom / 
Bubble Years 
Financial sector 
deregulation that 
began in the early 
1980’s allowed 
Japanese 
companies to go 
directly to the 
capital markets for 
financing – as an 
Lehman’s asset 
management 
business benefited 
greatly from the 
secular bull market 
in US equities, 
which essentially 
lasted between 
1983 and 2007. 
Although financial 
sector deregulation 
that began in the 
early 1980’s 
eroded LTCB’s 
large corporate 
client base, the 
booming Japanese 
economy meant 
Because of its 
status as a 
government-
sponsored 
enterprise, Fannie 
Mae enjoyed 
preferential 
funding rates since 
the market 
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 Yamaichi 
Securities 
Lehman Brothers Long-Term 
Credit Bank of 
Japan 
Fannie Mae 
investment bank, 
Yamaichi provided 
underwriting 
services for many 
of these 
companies’ debt 
and equity issues. 
 
Soaring Japanese 
markets during the 
1980’s meant 
corporate and 
individual clients 
that invested with 
Yamaichi grew 
wealthier – 
Yamaichi’s 
revenues from fees 
and service 
charges increased 
accordingly.   
 
Burgeoning US 
real estate markets 
(approximately 
between 1997 and 
2005) facilitated 
the marked 
increase in the 
practice of 
securitizing 
mortgage loans.  
As a major player 
in the 
securitization of 
mortgage-backed 
securities, Lehman 
generated high fees 
and profits.  
the bank still 
profited 
handsomely as 
riskier clients (e.g., 
real estate and 
construction 
companies) 
flourished during 
Japan’s bubble 
years.  
implicitly 
considered the 
firm’s credit 
backed by the US 
government. 
 
Burgeoning US 
real estate markets 
(approximately 
between 1997 and 
2005) facilitated 
the marked 
increase in the 
practice of 
securitizing 
mortgage loans.  
As a major player 
in the 
securitization of 
mortgage-backed 
securities, Fannie 
Mae generated 
high fees and 
profits. 
 
Impetus / 
Triggers for 
Impending Crisis 
Event 
After peaking in 
late 1989, sharply 
declining Japanese 
markets meant 
clients who had 
invested with 
Yamaichi had lost 
a lot of money.   
 
Yamaichi resorted 
to an illegal 
tobashi scheme to 
mollify large, 
disgruntled clients 
that had lost 
money.  Being 
implicated in such 
unethical practices 
seriously damaged 
the reputation of 
the firm. 
 
The absence of any 
significant 
recovery in 
Japanese equity 
US housing prices 
peaked in late 
2005 and began to 
a sharp decline 
thereafter.  This 
caused high 
default rates on 
subprime 
mortgages. 
 
A large player in 
the securitization 
of mortgages, 
Lehman was left 
holding vast 
quantities of 
illiquid securities 
based on bad 
mortgages. 
Lehman recorded 
heavy losses and 
its balance sheet 
deteriorated 
terribly. 
 
Lehman needed to 
Economically 
sensitive client 
base suffered 
terribly after the 
bursting of the 
asset bubble.  As a 
result, LTCB was 
left with a 
crippling amount 
of non-performing 
loans. 
 
Economic 
stagnation 
throughout the 
1990’s meant little 
chance of balance 
sheet recovery. 
 
Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 
exacerbated 
negative 
conditions in the 
Japanese financial 
sector.  
US housing prices 
peaked in late 
2005 and began to 
a sharp decline 
thereafter.  This 
caused high default 
rates on subprime 
mortgages. 
 
A large player in 
the securitization 
of mortgages, 
Fannie Mae was 
left holding vast 
quantities of 
illiquid securities 
based on bad 
mortgages. Fannie 
recorded heavy 
losses and its 
balance sheet 
deteriorated 
terribly. 
 
Worsening 
economic 
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 Yamaichi 
Securities 
Lehman Brothers Long-Term 
Credit Bank of 
Japan 
Fannie Mae 
prices weighed 
heavily on 
Yamaichi’s 
operating 
performance and 
deteriorating 
balance sheet.  
 
Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 
exacerbated 
negative 
conditions in the 
Japanese financial 
sector. 
 
raise more capital 
to shore up its 
balance sheet, but 
willing investors 
dissipated as the 
intensity of the 
financial crisis 
increased.   
 
Lehman rival Bear 
Sterns was 
JPMorgan Chase 
in March 2008 at a 
bargain basement 
price.  Shockwaves 
re-verberated 
through markets 
and confidence 
plummeted. 
 
Lehman’s last-
ditch efforts to sell 
itself to either 
Bank of America 
or Barclays Bank 
failed during the 
weekend of 13-14 
September 2008.  
 
conditions and an 
accelerated credit 
crunch owing to 
the financial crisis 
put Fannie Mae’s 
solvency at serious 
risk, in spite of 
assurances from 
the US 
government, 
during Summer 
2008.   
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis Event  Announced on 24 
November 1997 
the firm was 
ceasing operations 
(de facto 
bankruptcy). 
 
Filed for 
bankruptcy 
protection on 15 
September 2008. 
Announced on 23 
October 1998 that 
the bank would be 
nationalized by the 
Japanese 
government. 
Placed in the 
conservatorship of 
the Federal 
Housing Finance 
Agency on 7 
September 2008 
(de facto 
nationalization). 
 
Government 
Response 
Presumably 
deciding that 
Yamaichi was not 
too big to fail and 
holding steadfast 
to the principles of 
Big Bang, the 
Japanese 
government let 
Yamaichi fall into 
bankruptcy. 
 
US authorities 
were adamant that 
no bailout would 
be forthcoming for 
Lehman during its 
final days, and 
they stuck to their 
word, letting 
Lehman fall into 
bankruptcy.  
 
However, US 
Japanese 
authorities 
officially 
nationalized LTCB 
on 28 October 
1998. 
 
Thereafter, LTCB 
was restructured 
under Japanese 
government 
stewardship. 
US authorities 
placed Fannie Mae 
into 
conservatorship on 
7 September 2008. 
 
The US 
government’s 
future plans for 
Fannie Mae are 
currently 
undecided. 
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 Yamaichi 
Securities 
Lehman Brothers Long-Term 
Credit Bank of 
Japan 
Fannie Mae 
To avert panic in 
the financial 
markets, Japanese 
authorities 
reiterated that 
investors affected 
by the Yamaichi 
insolvency would 
be protected. 
 
authorities 
struggled in 
getting a rescue 
plan in place when 
markets panicked 
in the Lehman 
aftermath. 
 
 
In March 2000, 
LTCB was sold to 
a consortium led 
by US private 
equity firm 
Ripplewood 
Holdings. 
Market Response Nikkei 225 and 
Nikkei Bank Index 
fell -5.1% and -
7.7%, respectively, 
on Tuesday, 25 
November 1997, 
the day after 
Yamaichi’s failure. 
 
After the initial 
shock, both the 
Nikkei 225 and the 
Nikkei Bank Index 
recovered most of 
its losses by 
Friday, 28 
November 1997 (-
0.5% and -1.3%, 
respective 1-week 
returns). 
 
However, risk 
appeared 
heightened in the 
money markets.  
The 3-month, 
Japanese Yen 
Tokyo Interbank 
Offered Rate 
(TIBOR) leapt 
from 61 basis 
points (bps) to 116 
bps between 21 
November 1997 
(the last trading 
day before 
Yamaichi’s 
failure) and 30 
December 1997 
(the last trading 
day of the year). 
The S&P 500 slid -
4.7% and the 
KBW Bank Index 
tumbled -8.4% on 
15 September 
2008, the day 
Lehman filed for 
bankruptcy. 
 
1-week to 19 
September 2008, 
the S&P 500 
recovered +0.2% 
and the KBW 
Bank Index soared 
+16.3%, as 
investors 
speculated on a 
bailout for the 
beleaguered 
financial sector. 
 
As a measure of 
risk in the money 
market, the 
calculated TED 
spread spiked 66 
bps (from 135 bps, 
close spread on 
Friday, 12 
September 2008 to 
201 bps) on 
Monday, 15 
September 2008, 
the day Lehman 
filed for 
bankruptcy.  As 
the week 
progressed, panic 
ensued and by 
Thursday, 18 
Nikkei 225 and 
Nikkei Bank Index 
fell -2.1% and -
3.0%, respectively 
on Monday, 26 
October 1998, the 
first trading day 
after it was 
announced that 
LTCB would be 
nationalized. 
 
1-week to Friday, 
30 October 1998, 
the Nikkei 225 was 
down -4.1% and 
the Nikkei Bank 
Index had fallen -
3.5%. 
 
Risk in the money 
markets was 
largely unmoved 
by LTCB’s 
nationalization.  
The 3-month 
TIBOR increased 
slightly from 69 
bps to 75 bps 
between 23 
October 1998 (the 
last trading day 
before 
announcement of 
LTCB’s 
nationalization) 
and 30 December 
1998 (the last 
trading day of the 
year). 
 
The S&P 500 
increased +2.1% 
and the KBW 
Bank Index 
jumped +6.9% on 
8 September 2008, 
the day after 
Fannie Mae was 
placed in 
conservatorship. 
 
1-week to 12 
September 2008, 
the S&P 500 
increased slightly 
+0.7% and the 
KBW Bank Index 
rose +3.2%. 
 
As a measure of 
risk in the money 
market, the 
calculated TED 
spread increased 
slightly by 8 bps 
(from 104 bps, 
close spread on 
Friday, 5 
September 2008 to 
112 bps) on 
Monday, 8 
September 2008, 
the day after 
Fannie Mae was 
placed in 
conservatorship. 
As the week 
progressed, the 
TED spread 
opened up to 
closing at 135 bps 
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September 2008, 
the TED spread 
was at 313 bps.  
 
 
 on Friday, 12 
September 2008, 
before the Lehman 
fiasco. 
 
Impact, Results The Japanese 
administration’s 
decision to let 
Yamaichi go under 
can be considered 
a turning point of 
sorts in the solving 
of the Japanese 
banking crisis. 
 
It underscored 
Japan’s 
commitment to the 
principles of Big 
Bang and sent a 
message that 
poorly managed 
firms that were 
deemed not to 
have significant 
systemic risks 
would not be 
bailed out with 
taxpayers’ money. 
 
Instead, Japan’s 
emphasis on 
protecting 
investors seemed 
well-received. 
 
The equity 
market’s short-
term (1-week) 
reaction appeared 
supportive of the 
Japanese 
government’s 
decision to let 
Yamaichi fail. 
 
However, 
indications in the 
Japanese money 
market to the end 
of 1997 suggested 
Fearful of 
encouraging moral 
hazard, the US 
government was 
resolute in not 
using taxpayers’ 
money to bailout 
Lehman. 
 
Equity markets 
gyrated wildly, and 
traded in 
overreacted 
fashion on every 
bit of potentially 
material 
information. 
 
The panicked spike 
in the TED spread 
provided a scary 
pulse on the 
severity of the 
situation around 
the time of 
Lehman’s failure. 
 
Similar to Japan’s 
experience with 
the Yamaichi 
situation, the US 
government 
needed to let a big-
name like Lehman 
go under to ensure 
that the financial 
sector was clear 
that the US 
taxpayer should 
not underwrite 
needless risk-
taking. 
 
However, it 
appears that the 
US government 
The Japanese 
government made 
the assertion that 
LTCB was simply 
too large to fail, 
and the systemic 
risks – had it been 
allowed to do so – 
would have been 
too great. 
 
Investigation and 
prosecution of 
LTCB’s former 
management for 
wrongdoing sent a 
strong message 
that regulations 
would be 
rigorously 
enforced and 
presumably helped 
bolster confidence 
in the financial 
system. 
 
In the short-term, 
equity markets 
cheered (were 
relieved?) by the 
Japanese 
government’s 
decision to 
nationalize LTCB.  
 
The money market 
remained largely 
unchanged to the 
end of 1998, 
suggesting that 
risk in the financial 
system hadn’t been 
completely 
diffused, but 
hadn’t 
dramatically 
Fannie Mae was 
too vital to the US 
financial system to 
fail.  The US 
government’s de 
facto 
nationalization of 
the GSE is 
testament to this 
line of thinking. 
 
In the short-term, 
equity markets 
were relieved by 
the US 
government’s 
actions and rallied.  
However, the 
Lehman failure 
was only a week 
away at this time. 
 
The money market 
did not necessarily 
panic at Fannie 
Mae’s 
nationalization but 
also did not price 
in a lower level of 
risk in the financial 
system, either.  
The suspicions in 
the money market 
were proven a 
week later after the 
Lehman failure, 
when panic broke 
loose. 
 
Currently, Fannie 
Mae continues its 
function as 
secondary 
mortgage market 
liquidity provider 
under US 
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that risks in the 
financial system 
were still apparent 
(which were 
proven given other 
failures, such as 
the LTCB 11 
months after the 
fact). 
 
has had little 
choice but to 
provide an 
unprecedented 
amount of stimulus 
to stem the 
worsening of the 
credit crunch and 
the economy as a 
whole, and its 
fumbling in getting 
a rescue package 
together may have 
negatively affected 
the economy as a 
whole. 
  
increased either. 
 
Nevertheless, the 
proactive 
nationalization of 
LTCB reiterated to 
the market that the 
Japanese 
government would 
work expediently 
to do what was 
necessary in the 
best interests of the 
financial sector 
and the economy 
as a whole. 
 
LTCB’s ambitious 
re-structuring 
under Japanese 
government 
stewardship is 
commendable 
though its hurried 
sale to Ripplewood 
Holdings in 2000 
garnered criticism 
that Japan did not 
get fullvalue for 
taxpayers. 
 
However, 
Shinsei’s (LTCB’s 
new name) anemic 
performance since 
its 2004 IPO 
suggests, perhaps, 
the Japanese 
government did 
not sell too 
cheaply after all.  
 
 
government 
stewardship.  Its 
future role in 
financial markets, 
however, is 
unclear. 
 
Still, some 
assertions can be 
made.  For 
instance, the 
confused 
accountability of 
Fannie Mae led to 
improper 
governance.  Risk-
taking at Fannie 
Mae was 
excessive; moral 
hazard was 
certainly at play.  
These issues 
clearly need to be 
rectified.  
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Key Lessons • The market must be allowed to punish poorly managed firms, as illustrated 
with the case of Yamaichi.   
• Where a financial institution’s viability as a going concern will have a 
significant impact on the health of the financial sector and economy as a 
whole, authorities must be willing to take dramatic and expensive measures 
(i.e., taking an equity stake, nationalization), even if such measures are 
politically unpalatable. Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan’s nationalization is 
a textbook case of this, as is that of Fannie Mae.  
• However, extraordinary government intervention should be used 
judiciously, and only where necessary, so as not to exacerbate the potential 
for moral hazard. 
• This said, there is reason to support the notion that firms that have become 
“too big to fail” may also be “too big to make all of their own decisions.”   
• For the sake of market and consumer confidence, financial regulations must 
be kept current with market developments and be stringently enforced to 
discourage against wrongdoing and unethical behaviour.  Yamaichi’s 
involvement with the tobashi scheme is one example of how such 
wrongdoing is damaging to confidence. 
• Prudential rules concerning the solvency of financial institutions must be 
rigorously enforced, given the central role that banks and financial 
companies play in a modern economy.  The speed of the collapses of 
Lehman and Fannie Mae suggest that more may need to be done with 
respect to evaluating the off-balance sheet transactions of financial 
companies. 
• The management of a financial institution (and any publicly traded 
company, for that matter) must be taken to task if the public disclosure does 
not accurately reflect the going situation of the financial institution, as was 
with the case of the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan.  The significance of 
consumer and market confidence cannot be overstated and accurate 
disclosure is essential. 
• Governments must be willing to undertake bold action to reform weaknesses 
in the ever-changing financial sector, even if such measures are politically 
unpopular.   
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